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Abstract
Spam is still an open problem from the network operator's perspective. The
common state-of-the-art strategy is to place lters against spam at the re-
cipient's edge. Although this strategy largely solves the spam problem from
the user's perspective but the false positives/negatives may still exist. This
strategy is also unable to prevent spam from traversing the Internet. Con-
sequently, we now have around 260 billion spam messages sent across the
Internet each day. Spam is therefore consuming large amounts of Internet
bandwidth and is imposing non-negligible nancial loss to network opera-
tors. Therefore it becomes imperative to mitigate spam much earlier than
is typically done today.
The main part of this thesis proposes LENS, a novel, easily adaptable
and scalable spam protection system that is incrementally deployable with
low processing overheads. LENS leverages the recipient's social network
to allow correspondence within the social network to directly pass to the
mailbox of the recipient. LENS further mitigates spam beyond social circles
and stops spam messages early on, instead of ltering these messages from
user mailboxes or at the recipient's edge.
The key idea in LENS is to select legitimate and authentic users, called
Gatekeepers (GKs), from outside the recipient's social circle and within pre-
dened social distances. LENS utilizes the GK to generate a voucher, and
new senders are required to obtain these vouchers (to communicate with the
recipient) from a GK in their social neighborhood. Recipients recover from
compromised GKs simply by selecting replacements and revoking vouchers.
Unless a GK vouches for the emails of potential senders from outside the
social circle of a particular recipient, those e-mails are prevented from trans-
mission. In this way LENS drastically reduces the consumption of Internet
bandwidth by spam.
The contributions of this thesis are the development of social network
based spam mitigation framework (LENS ), a system design based on this
framework, the evaluation of the system by means of simulation and a proto-
type implementation. The evaluations show that with the help of hundreds
of GKs, LENS can provide reliable email delivery from millions of poten-
v
Abstract
tial users. LENS imposes Zero overhead for the common case of frequent
and familiar senders, and remains lightweight for the general case. Using
real email traces, the simulations show that LENS is eective in accepting
all legitimate inbound emails. Our prototype implementation of LENS in
Postx/MailAvenger shows that LENS consumes up to 75% less CPU, 9%
less memory and it is around 2-3 orders of magnitude faster in processing
emails than traditional solutions like SpamAssassin.
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Introduction
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is an Internet standard that denes
the transmission of electronic mail (email) between dierent hosts across the
IP networks. SMTP was designed with an emphasis on simplicity. It has a
simple addressing scheme with low implementation and administration cost.
This has resulted in huge popularity and support of the protocol on many
platforms by dierent vendors.
The original SMTP specication focused on designing simple, exible
and open email systems. It did not contain the facility to authenticate
the senders which made it easy to hide information about where an email
message is coming from and what it contains. This omission of the early days
led to a system that fundamentally trusts the participants. This however,
has turned out to be a huge mistake and malicious users have utilized this
weakness to their advantage for sending spams. Unfortunately, extensive
modication of SMTP or its complete replacement, is not practical, due to
the network eects of the huge installation base of SMTP servers. Over
the years spam has become such a nuisance, incurring huge nancial and
infrastructural cost, that by law spamming is considered a punishable crime
in developed countries.
This thesis proposes a novel spam protection system that leverages so-
cial network of a recipient to extend the underlying trust infrastructure for
mitigating unwanted/spam emails. The rest of the chapter discusses the
motivation behind the proposed approach for spam mitigation and lists out
the key contributions in the thesis.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Currently, it is just as easy to send an email to a stranger as it is to send it to
friends. This has led to an immense abuse over the past decade in the form
of unsolicited emails (spam). Despite the fact that researchers and prac-
titioners have developed and deployed a broad variety of systems intended
to prevent spam [8, 10, 11, 16, 40, 41, 50, 71, 75], spam messages keeps
on increasing. In this cat-and-mouse game between e-mail spammers and
1
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the anti-spam community, the spammers are still winning with spam emails
largely outnumbering legitimate ones. Spam emails have now increased from
65% [15] in 2005 to 89.1% (262 billion spam mails/day) in 2010 [4]. There
are primarily two main reason for the huge infestation of spam. First, there
is a microscopic infrastructural cost to send spam. Anyone with a simple
computer hooked up with the internet and a mailing list can easily start a ca-
reer in e-mail marketing. Second, there is no ownership of spam. Spammers
remain anonymous, hiding their identities and true origins, due to which it
is not easy to take legal actions against malicious individuals.
Existing approaches to combat spam falls roughly into four broad cate-
gories:
 Content-based ltering
 Sender authentication approach
 Header-based approach
 Social network and trust based approach
Each of the above approaches has certain disadvantages which are dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. In short, the common state-of-the-art strategy used
today is to lter spam from the user's inbox (i.e. recipient's edge). The
problem with this approach is that it allows spam to traverse the network,
and incur non-negligible cost to network operators in terms of bandwidth
and infrastructure (spam is projected to cost $338 billion by 2013 [13]). On
the other hand, content-based ltering [1, 10] which is one of the most widely
adopted defense mechanism against spam has turned the spam problem into
an email classication problem and results in unreliable email delivery due
to false positives and false negatives. A false negative is when a spam email
is classied as legitimate and placed in the inbox, whereas a false positive is
the classication of a legitimate email as spam. False positive can result in
delayed or non-access to an important email, thereby may potentially have
a serious business implication [45].
There have been innumerable attempts to mitigate spam, including re-
cent solutions that exploit trust embedded in social networks to create so-
lutions without false positives [39, 59]. RE: [39] proposed that recipients
can trust senders in their immediate social neighborhood, and used a zero
false-positive mechanism for vetting emails sent by their friends or friends
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of friends (FoFs)1. However, emails coming from outside of this circle still
needs to be veried by noisy and unreliable spam lters. In contrast, Os-
tra [59] introduced a careful system of credits that allows anyone to send
email to anyone else, as long as their balance of credits allows them to get a
token. Unfortunately, for Ostra to be successful, the entire network would
need to adopt the system.
So far, the solutions to block spam has done nothing more than being a
minor inconvenience to spammers. The spam infestation is growing faster
than the anti-spam community can keep up with and most anti-spam tech-
niques so far have been like pesticides that do nothing more than create a
new, resistant strain of bugs. Hence, there is a need for new mechanisms
that impose zero cost on the legitimate users and make it hard for mali-
cious spammer to adapt or bypass. Further, the solution should focus on
processing spam at an earlier stage of transmission to save bandwidth and
infrastructural costs.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
The aim of this thesis is to create a system that, like RE: [39] can be deployed
individually by small groups of users, but allows for a reach greater than
FoFs. The most important novelty of the scheme proposed in this thesis over
RE: is that LENS demonstrates that it is feasible and practical to extend
the reach of social network trust beyond FoFs. In order to accomplish
this, a per-recipient ego-centric view of the entire social network of email
users is created. Anyone who is within a recipient's community (i.e., a
friend or FoFs in the context of this thesis can email the recipient directly.
To enable legitimate senders who are farther away, LENS enlists a set of
trusted users, called GateKeepers (GKs) at various hop counts from the
recipient. These GKs are used to vouch for new senders in the immediate
social circle of the GKs by issuing them un-forgeable vouchers. Essentially,
the protocol requires a rst-time sender's (senders from outside the social
circle of a particular recipient) mail server (MS ) to present a valid voucher
before sending the payload. This enables the recipient's MS to quickly
terminate an invalid connection, saving valuable resources both in the MS
and in the network.
Although this solution is simple and straightforward, there are sev-
eral advantages. First, graphs of social networks are known to be small
1Henceforth, the terms community, social network, social circle or immediate social
neighborhood will be used to refer to the set of friends + FoFs of a user
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worlds [72] and have small dominating sets [21, 31]. Thus, with only a
modest number of GKs, each recipient is able to cover a large part of the
legitimate social network, allowing most people to reach it. Secondly, a com-
promised or rogue node is able to spam only those recipients who have chosen
it as a GK. Since the process of GK selection is performed independently by
each recipient, the breakdown of individual GKs does not compromise the
security of most recipients. The aected recipients can curtail their damage
by rotating their GKs. Finally, the protocol requires a rst-time sender'sMS
to present a valid voucher before transmitting the data (header and body of
the message). This enables a recipient'sMS to lter an invalid connection at
the sender's edge, thereby saving valuable resources both in the recipient's
MS and in the network. This feature becomes especially important when
dealing with spams with large payloads such as viruses or other attachments.
The key contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows:
1. Unlike the existing social network based approaches, LENS is not
limited to the social circle of an email user. LENS proposes a feasible
and practical approach to extend spam prevention beyond a user's
social circle, covering all the communication scenarios for legitimate
inbound emails.
2. One major approach in ghting spam is to look for the spamming
email addresses or IPs and block them. This approach is harder than
it looks, since spammers regularly change their whereabouts to bypass
IP and address based lters. This thesis explores a dierent path and
instead of identifying spammers, LENS tries to identify legitimate
users inorder to facilitate genuine emails from reliable MSs.
3. LENS is capable of ltering all the legitimate inbound emails at the
SMTP time, before the actual transmission of email payload. This
enables the recipient's MS to quickly terminate any invalid connection
and prevent the transmission of spam across the network.
4. The thesis also proposes iSATS, a new crypto-based email sender au-
thentication mechanism. iSATS is complementary to LENS and pro-
vides a reliable way to bind the identity of a legitimate sender to an
email. On the other hand, it is hard for a spammer to adopt or bypass
the system without getting noticed.
Finally, LENS is extensively evaluated using three large social networks
(Flickr, Facebook and Google Buzz) and two traces of email transactions
4
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(Uni-Kiel and Enron). LENS is able to receive all incoming emails in the
email traces by using less than 0.06% of users as GKs per recipient. The
analysis of social network traces demonstrate that a recipient in the LENS
system needs just a few hundred GKs in order to receive reliable emails
from a substantial portion of the entire social network. For the email traces
around 80% to 92% of the selected GKs have less than 300 recipients. Thus,
even if an attacker is able to compromise a GK, the aected number of re-
cipients is limited. Our stress tests and micro benchmarks on the prototype
implementation show that the overheads imposed by the additional process-
ing are tolerably small. LENS is signicantly less compute intensive (up to
75% less CPU and 9% less memory) than current solutions like SpamAssas-
sin.
1.3 Thesis Overview
In the remainder of this thesis, the related work is discussed in Chapter 2.
Later on, Chapter 3 introduces the overall architecture and system design of
LENS. Chapter 4 illustrates prototype implementation of LENS and email
processing based on this prototype. Chapter 5 introduces a new crypto-
based email sender authentication scheme complementary to LENS. Chap-
ter 6 details upon questions concerning the security of the system. Af-
terwards, in Chapter 7 an in-depth evaluation of LENS is performed to
demonstrate the scalability, eectiveness and eciency of the system. Fi-
nally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
Spam can loosely be dened as unwanted and unsolicited emails that target
large sections of the \legitimate" populace of email users. While many of
the legitimate emails can be categorized as regular correspondence (and
therefore considered solicited or wanted), the ability to send unsolicited
emails is crucial for bootstrapping new communications.
It has been observed that spammers need to send a huge number of
emails simply because the end goal of a large fraction of spam is direct
marketing, and the conversion rate is extremely low [48]. An interesting
recent suggestion is to attack spam by blocking the handful of payment
gateways that are used when a spam victim ends up making a nancial
transaction [52]. However, payment gateways could also end up being a
moving target.
It is possible to sidestep from the issue of identifying unwanted emails
and simply curtail the sending rate of spammers. Proof-of-work and com-
putational puzzles have been used as pricing mechanisms that create re-
source bottlenecks and limit sending rates [17, 32]. However, today's spam-
mers control large botnets and computational power is unlikely to be the
primary bottleneck. Computational puzzles requiring human interventions
(e.g. CAPTCHAs) are outsourced [30].
Researchers and practitioners have developed and deployed a broad vari-
ety of approaches intended to prevent spam. These approaches roughly fall
into four broad categories reviewed in the following sections of this chapter.
2.1 Content-Based Filtering
Content-based ltering uses heuristics and machine learning methods based
on lters and keywords for spam recognition. It is the most popular spam
protection technique and is widely available in most free and commercial
implementations. SpamAssassin [10] and DSPAM [1] are two representative
examples. Apart from spam protection, content-based lters are also helpful
in mitigating other types of unwanted communication, such as blog spam
[57] and network-based security attacks [51].
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Unfortunately content-based ltering exhibits several problems which
limits its usage. These problems include the intrinsic cost of initialization
and continuous adaptation of the lters [42, 74], false positives (unwanted
email classied as legitimate) and false negatives (legitimate email marked
as spam). False negatives are more or less just an inconvenience. Whereas,
false positives are more of a serious concern since important/urgent messages
are marked as unwanted and thus may be delayed or not received at all
[44]. Moreover, spammers and lter developers are engaged in a continuous
arms race [42], because the cognitive and visual capabilities of humans allow
spammers to encode their message in a way that can by-pass the ltering
programs.
2.2 Email Sender Authentication
Email infrastructure was not designed to verify the authenticity of a sender
address/identity. This weakness is greatly exploited by zombie networks or
botnets to send spam/phishing messages with forged from: addresses. It
is a well-known fact that the majority of spam messages today, 88.2% of
the total spam according to some estimates [67], are sent by botnets using
forged addresses.
Email sender authentication mechanisms enable receivers to automat-
ically distinguish forgeries from authentic messages. This section explores
several sender authentication protocols proposed over the years out of which
Sender Policy Framework (SPF ) and Domain Keys Identied Mail (DKIM )
are the most adopted ones.
PGP and S/MIME
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [23] and S/MIME are both cryptographic ap-
proaches that sign the message body using public-key cryptography and
append the signature in the body. In PGP, Keys are stored in end-user
keyrings or in public key-servers. Key management uses a peer-to-peer web-
of-trust architecture. Whereas in S/MIME, management follows a hierar-
chical model similar to SSL and keys are signed by a certicate authority.
Despite their presence for a long time, PGP and S/MIME are not widely
used. Majority of mail user agents (MUAs) support S/MIME by default,
still vast majority of email sent out is not signed. There are no published
results that give a basis for the low adoption of PGP and S/MIME, but
according to some experts [76] average users don't sign their outgoing email
because they nd it inconvenient to manage keys and enter pass phrases.
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Figure 2.1: Example of an email with forged from: address.
Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
SPF [75] is an IP-based sender authentication scheme that operates on
SMTP envelope (MAIL FROM:) to block forgeries at SMTP time. SPF al-
lows the domain administrators to publish the IPs or range of IPs for their
valid server(s) on DNS in simple text format referred to as SPF record.
When the email exchange begins, the receiving side can query the DNS for
sender's SPF record to validate if sender's IP is listed in the address range
specied by the sender's domain.
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Figure 2.2: Publishing and lookups of SPF record via DNS.
According to [60], SPF is the most adopted sender authentication scheme
and over 60% of the prominent domains have published their SPF record
as of July 2011. However, due to its simplicity, SPF is also easily adopted
by spammers. According to [60] 20+% of spamming domains have already
adopted SPF. If the majority of spamming domains adopt SPF over time,
SPF would become useless. [60] also showed that signicant amount of spam
is successfully authenticated by SPF and on the other hand around 5+% of
legitimate messages can potentially fail SPF tests. In email forwarding, it
is a common practice not to change the return path or MAIL FROM: message
envelops and this is an Achilles' heel in IP-based SPF [76]. Unless the
return path is edited during forwarding, the receiver will treat the message
as forgery for not coming directly from its listed sender.
Domain Keys Identied Mail (DKIM )
DKIM [16] signs the email headers and body using public-key cryptography,
and append the signature in a DomainKey-Signature header. The signature
keys are bind to a domain name and the domain admins publish the public-
key in the DNS. The receiver can query the DNS to extract the public-key
of the sender and verify the signature. A successful verication implies that
the message content was not forged during the transmission and the message
is actually from the sender responsible for it.
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Figure 2.3: Example of email header with DKIM signature and authentica-
tion results.
In DKIM, the signature can only be evaluated after the entire message
content is received, thus, it is not possible to reject spam at earlier stages
or during SMTP time. DKIM is prone to content munging and if the
message content is altered during transit, DKIM will fail. DKIM cannot
evaluate the trustworthiness of a sender and the spammers can also adopt
it to sign their own messages. However, [68] shows that only 2% of spam
received are authenticated by DKIM, which is signicantly less than the
spam authenticated by SPF.
Sender-ID
Sender-ID [56] can be interpreted as an extension to SPF. It relies on the
SPF infrastructure and veries the sender's IP address for authenticating
the sender of an email. The basic dierence between SPF and Sender-ID is
that SPF veries the envelope sender mentioned in the MAIL FROM: address,
whereas, Sender-ID operates on purported responsible address (PRA) [55]
of a message, which is the sender given in the header of a message. As with
SPF, recipients can check if the purported sender's IP address matches the
one that is published on the DNS. Since Sender-ID works on PRA in the
message header, it cannot authenticate the message at SMTP time.
Microsoft holds the intellectual property rights to Sender-ID specica-
tion and Microsoft has published Sender-ID under a royalty free patent
license agreement [28]. However, the license itself is a point of conict in
open source community and it is considered to be incompatible and contrary
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to normal open Internet standards [29, 64]. Further, Sender-ID claims MAIL
FROM: and PRA to be interchangeable at all times, but in reality this is not
the case. In order to avoid compatibility issues, it would be necessary to
publish records for Sender-ID separately.
Occam's Razor
Occam [36] is real-time challenge-based authentication protocol to validate
the binding between individual domain names and legitimate mail sources
for those domains. When an email arrives, the receiver simply sends a query
to the sending domain identied in a message whether it actually sent the
message. If the email is legitimate, the domain will acknowledge sending
the message. On the other hand, if no acknowledgment is received from
the identied sender then the receiver can classify the email as illegitimate.
Operations of Occam protocol are illustrated in gure 2.4.
Being a challenge-based authentication system, Occam transfers the re-
sponsibility of email authentication to the sender on a per-domain basis. In
order to join the system a spammer has to provide online servers capable of
handling queries about any e-mail sent from that domain. This requirement
increases the infrastructure cost on the spammer. Moreover, since the ad-
dresses of the servers are visible, the spammers are exposed during a spam
campaign, thus becoming prime target for blacklisting.
Figure 2.4: Occam's real-time challenge-based authentication (source [36]).
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On the downside, spammers can abuse the challenge-based protocol as
a reector DDoS attack. A spammer can attack any domain by sending
millions of messages claiming to be originated from that domain. As a
result, receivers will then direct millions of validation requests to the domain
identied in the Occam-header.
2.3 Header-Based Approach
Header-based approach examines the header of an email to detect spam.
This approach can be categorized as white lists and black lists. White lists
schemes collect a list of all the emails that are trusted to be non-spammers.
Any email sourced from the addresses in the white lists is sent to the inbox.
White listing is highly vulnerable to from: address forgery; therefore it must
be used together with sender authentication schemes. Blacklists schemes,
in contrasts stores the IP-addresses of all the spammers (email addresses
are easily forgeable and are ineective 95% of the time [26]) and refuse to
accept emails from them. Manually generated lists have proved to be highly
ecient but put a heavy maintenance burden on the email user.
2.4 Social Network and Trust Based Approaches
In Social Network, Trust and Reputation Systems, network users try to cal-
culate the reliability and trustworthiness of other users based on their own
experiences and that of others. This section reviews several recent tech-
niques that use social networks and trust and reputation systems to combat
spam.
Personal Email
Boykin and Roychowdhury have pioneered the idea of using social networks
for message ltering [22]. Boykin proposed to create an individual user's
trusted network of friends (social network) or personal email network solely
from the sender and recipient information available in the email headers of
all the email messages in that user's inbox.
Boykin analyzed the email header in the user's inbox to extract the list
of recipient addresses, stored in the To: and Cc: elds. These addresses are
then represented as nodes in the personal email network. The nodes (ad-
dresses) that appear in the same header i.e. that have communicated with
the user are joined together via the edge. With the help of the structural
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property of this personal email network, particularly the propensity of lo-
cal clustering, email messages are classied as legitimate, spam or unknown
based on clustering thresholds.
In the empirical studies of individual mail boxes, personal email network
classied approximately 53% of all emails as spam or non-spam, with 100%
accuracy i.e. with zero false positives. However, 47% emails were left unclas-
sied by this network analysis tool and were passed onto existing ltering
techniques. The proposed scheme has two very useful features. First, it is
free from any user intervention or supervised training. Second, it is immune
to false negatives i.e., non-spam being misclassied as spam.
RE: Reliable Email
RE: Reliable Email [39] introduce the idea that recipients can trust senders
in their immediate social neighborhood, and gave a zero false-positive mech-
anism for vetting emails sent by their immediate social circle. RE: is an
email acceptance system that uses whitelist of friends and friends of friends
(FoFs) to increase the communication chance of only white list friends. RE:
directly delivers the accepted messages to the recipient's inbox and passes
the unidentied ones to the existing spam lters.
RE:'s main goal is to eradicate the unreliability introduced in emails by
content-based lters and other spam ghting technologies which misclassify
legitimate mail as spam. By using friends and FoF based whitelisting, RE:
can accept almost 75% of the received emails and prevent up to 88% false
positive by the existing spam lters. With the addition of FoFs protocol
there is 10% increase in accepted emails compared to content-based ltering
techniques.
Sender-based whitelisting is one of the simplest concepts used in email
acceptance system. However, traditional whitelists have three issues limiting
its usage. First, a recipient's whitelist cannot accept email from an unknown
sender. Second, populating of whitelists requires manual eort. Finally,
whitelists are vulnerable to forging of from: addresses.
In order to overcome these limitations, RE: automatically extends the
set of senders whose mail is accepted by recipient's whitelists by explicitly
examining the social network (friends and FoFs) among email users. Fur-
ther, RE: appends an authentication token with each outgoing message to
protect against from: address forgery. The RE: protocol is summarized as
follows.
 Every user in RE: maintains a public key (PK ) and secret key (SK )
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pair. The user keeps the SK private and publishes his PK with his
Attestation Server (AS ).
 The users are allowed to issue an attestation that another user is a
legitimate sender. If a user A attest a user B it will be written as A
! B, which indicates that A is willing to have email from B directly
forwarded to his mailbox. In other words, \User A trusts his friend B
not to send him spam". An attestation contains the identities of the
attester and the attestee along with the expiration date. Formally, an
attestation is written as:
A ! B = ( Hash(A), Hash(B), start, duration) SKA.
 All the domains participating in RE: are required to run an AS. The
AS is responsible for storing the PKs of its users and the PKs of users
attested to by its users. Further, it is also the responsibility of the AS
to store the attestations both by and to the users of that domain.
Figure 2.5: Email exchange and FoF attestation in RE: (source: [39])
 Figure 2.5 illustrates how an email is exchanged between a sender (S )
and a receiver (R) running RE:. At the beginning, S composes a
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message with authentication token and sends it to R. The authentica-
tion token is signed by the secret key of S and it is used as a defense
mechanism against from: address forgery.
 On the receiving side, R can accept the email in one of two ways,
depending on whether the sender is a friend or FoFs. For the validation
of direct friendship, R examines the attestation list to see if it has
attested for S. If R ! S exists, RE: veries the authentication token
and accepts the message directly to the inbox.
 If S doesn't have a direct friendship with R, it will search for a FoF
relationship. In other words, R will seek if S is a direct friend with
any of his friends i.e. is there any x such that R ! x and x ! S ?
To solve this mystery, R will send a FoF query to the S's AS with
list of his direct friends. As a response the S's AS will send a list
of attestations to the sender from those direct friends. Based on the
presence of the attestation the FoF query is considered successful and
RE: will accept the message to R's inbox.
In order to maintain the privacy of the users, R never sends its list of
friends directly to S. R performs the FoF query using a private set matching
protocol. This private matching protocol is realized with the help of spe-
cial mathematical properties of particular public-key encryption schemes,
such as Paillier [63] and a variant of ELGamal [34]. RE: has a couple of
shortcomings listed below.
 Emails other than friends and FoFs still had to be ltered by noisy and
unreliable spam lters. LENS, on the other hand extends the reliable
delivery of emails beyond FoFs with the help of legitimate GKs.
 Cost of processing an email is too high and RE: employees a lot of
structural overheads. Each user needs to maintain a pair of PK and
SK, resulting in maintaining a system wide PKI (public key infras-
tructure) and AS for each domain. It would have been easier to use
existing protocols like digitally signed emails, instead of going through
all this architectural complexity.
 Discussion on the revocation of keys, authentication tokens and attes-
tations is vague.
 RE: has an ill-dened security model. Freedman [37] has discussed the
security short comings of RE: and proposed an ecient and stronger
solution with similar cost.
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It takes a village to stop spam
Seairth Jacobs [46] proposed a system where the users place more trust
on their friends or social network. If an email is received from the social
network it is directly accepted. On the other hand, if the email originates
from outside the social network the recipient will ask his friends in the social
network \do you know/trust this address"? The recipient will trust the email
as safe if any of his friends trust the sender. If none of the recipient's friends
know the sender they will ask the recipient to extend his query with their
friends. The outline of the system proposed by Seairth can be summarized
as follows.
The incoming emails fall into two categories, the email received from
the known addresses i.e. friends and the other that are unknown. The user
maintains a whitelist, containing the addresses of his friends or the users
he directly trust. Any email coming from the addresses on the whitelist
is directly accepted. The user also maintains a network le in the form of
FOAF [14] that can be used by anyone to query the user. The FOAF le
contains two dierent types of entries.
1. Email address only. This means that the user only knows the email
address.
2. Email Address and link to related person's FOAF le (FOAF
les are assumed to be shared on the web by each user). This indicates
that the user not only knows the email address but also thinks that
the person can be trusted and queried for the people he knows.
If an email is received from the email address listed in the whitelist it
will be directly accepted. On the other hand if an email is received from an
unknown address (e.g. abc@example.com) the user/system will one by one
ask all the persons he knows (in the whitelist) to see if anyone is familiar
with abc@example.com. If the answer is no the user will use the FOAF
les of the friends and move to next hop/level of people to inquire about
abc@example.com. The levels/hops to search and ask for opinion are left on
the user's choice. Seairth also suggests that the weight of trust should be
reduced as the number of hops increase. One way to do this is to increase
the number of people who recognize the address. An example of this might
be:
 1-3 hops: at least one person must recognize the address.
 4-5 hops: at least two people must recognize the address.
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 6-10 hops: at least four people must recognize the address.
The scalability of the system is a big question mark. For every unknown
email received the same search intensive procedure will be applied which
seems to be highly inecient. Seairth has also proposed some optimization
for the search operations, which includes limiting the number of queries a
user can make to inquire about an unknown address and sorting the list of
ends based on the number of people they claim to know (highest number
on the top).
SocialFilter
SocialFilter [66] proposes a collaborative spam mitigation system that uses
social trust embedded in online social network and audits reports to assess
the trustworthiness of spam reporter. Spam reports from the SocialFilter
nodes are stored in a centralized repository that computes the trust values
of the reports and identies spammers based on IP addresses. Figure 2.6
depicts the high-level architecture of SocialFilter, comprising of following
components.
Figure 2.6: Architecture of SocialFilter (source [66]).
1. Admins: Human users that join a social network with a unique ac-
count and fulll the responsibility to administer networked devices/net-
works.
2. SocialFilter Nodes: SocialFilter nodes are the spam reporters which
are managed by human administrators (admins). These nodes are
responsible for monitoring and reporting the behavior of the email
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senders. Nodes maintained by trusted admins are expected to gener-
ate trustworthy spammer reports, while nodes managed by less knowl-
edgeable admins are likely to generate unreliable reports.
3. Spammer Reports: These are the reports submitted by the Social-
Filter nodes related to the status of email sender they observe. The
reporting node also assigns a condence level to its report. The weight
of the report is calculated by the repository based on the reporter trust
of a node, its identity uniqueness and its condence level.
4. Centralized Report Repository: Centralized repository receives
and stores spammer reports, and computes trust values.
In SocialFilter all the spammer reports concerning the spamming hosts
are registered against their IP addresses. This may act as a limiting factor
for SocialFilter, as spammers may use dynamic IPs. In general, IP blacklists
are cumbersome to maintain and evadable [43].
SOAP
Figure 2.7 shows the structure of SOAP. SOAP integrates three new compo-
nents to the existing Bayesian lter. Application of each of these components
is briey summarized below.
Figure 2.7: The structure of SOAP (source [53]).
1. Social closeness-based spam ltering: SOAP explores personal
information in the social network to calculate the closeness between
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nodes. Nodes with higher closeness are considered not to send spam,
whereas emails from nodes having lower closeness are checked more
strictly. Social closeness also helps SOAP against poison attacks.
2. Social interest-based spam ltering: SOAP gathers node's (dis)interests
based on their social proles and use it to enhance the accuracy of spam
detection. This component helps SOAP realize personalized spam l-
tering.
3. Adaptive trust management: This component helps in preventing
impersonation attacks. SOAP utilizes additive increase/multiplicative-
decrease algorithm (AIMD) to regulate the trust values of nodes based
on the social closeness values to block emails from low-trust or normal
nodes due to impersonation by spammers.
There are several issues with SOAP that will limit its usage; this includes
the intrinsic cost of initialization and continuous adaptation of social close-
ness (between sender and recipient) and social interests (of an individual)
in the Bayesian lter. Moreover, the integration of online-social network is
quite abstract in the description. Integrating an online-social network with
an email network will raise a lot of privacy and ownership related concerns.
SOAP will require complete access to the social graphs of the user, which
is hard to achieve at the rst place.
Ostra
Ostra [59] leverages the number of trust relationships a user has, for instance
social links, to prevent unwanted communication in both email and content
sharing systems such as YouTube. Ostra introduces a careful system of
credits that allows anyone to send email to anyone else, as long as their
balance of credits allows them to get a token.
Ostra connects senders and receivers via chain of pairwise trust rela-
tionships leveraging existing trust networks. With the help of a pairwise,
link-based credit scheme Ostra imposes a cost on the sender if it generates an
unwanted communication without requiring sender authentication or global
identities. In Ostra, unwanted communication is classied based on the feed-
back from the receivers. Even in the absence of direct relationship between
the sender and the ultimate recipient of the communication, Ostra guaran-
tees that unwanted communication drains the originator's trust. This means
that generation of continuous unwanted communication will eventually iso-
late the sender and will result in inability of the sender to communicate.
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Figure 2.8: Diagram of (a) the original communication system S, and (b)
the communication system with Ostra (source: [59]).
Ostra runs as a separate module along with the existing communication
system. Figure 2.8 shows the three phases in which Ostra interacts with any
given communication system S. Each phase is summarized below.
1. Authorization: In the rst phase a sender generates and passes the
communication to Ostra. Ostra then authorize this communication by
issuing a token specic to the sender, recipient, and communication.
Each user is allocated a credit balance on a per-user or per-link basis
and this credit is used by Ostra to determine whether a token can be
issued or not. In other words, if a sender has previously generated too
much unwanted communication his credit would be negative. Due to
which Ostra will refuse to issue a token and the communication would
be rejected in the very initial stage.
2. Transmission: Once the token is authorized, Ostra attaches the to-
ken to the communication and uses the existing communication system
to transmit it. On the receiving side, the communication is accepted
only if a valid token is present. The communication is then passed on
to the recipient.
3. Classication: In this phase the recipient classies the communica-
tion as either wanted or unwanted, based on his/her preferences. This
information is then passed on to Ostra, which makes this feedback
available to the sender.
Scalability of this system is questionable specially when it has to main-
tain a per link credit scheme. Although a decentralized central tracker
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component can be introduced in order to make the system more scalable,
but such a scheme has not been implemented or evaluated. Ostra further
leverages feedback to modify the weight of the edges in the social network
dynamically for each message. This is a very big overhead on the system.
Finally, for Ostra to be successful, the entire network would need to adopt
the system.
MailRank
MailRank [26] also classies and rank emails according to the address of
email senders using a trust and reputation scheme which is similar to what
Boykin et al. [22] does. The primary goal of MailRank is to allocate a
rank to each email address known to the system and to use this rank to
decide whether each email belongs to a spammer or not, and to accumulate
a ranking among the ltered non-spam emails.
In order to compute relevant ratings for trust/reputation algorithms, it
is essential to gather as many personal votes as possible. Furthermore, the
maintenance of the system should require little or no eort at all to achieve
a high acceptance. This means that the collection of personal ratings of
each email address should require little or no manual user interactions and
preferably it should be computed automatically. These goals are realized in
MailRank by using already existing data inferred from the mutual communi-
cation between the users, i.e., who has exchanged emails with whom? There
are three distinguish information sources that best served the purpose:
1. User Address books: If a user A has the addresses of users B1, B2,
..., Bn in its address book, then it is assumed that A trust those users.
2. To: elds of outbound emails (i.e., To:, Cc: and Bcc:): If A
sends emails to B, then A is assumed to trust B, or in other words A
votes for B. This information is more accurate than address book entry,
since the address book entry may be old or outdated. Furthermore,
this data is also accessible via a light-weight email proxy deployed on
any machine, whereas address books are private and require owner's
permission in order to be accessed.
3. Auto-whitelists: Anti-spam tools (e.g., SpamAssassin) maintains a
list of email addresses from which emails have been received recently,
along with a score to determine if the address is spam or ham. All
email addresses with a high score can be added to Auto-whitelists and
can be viewed as trusted addresses.
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TrustMail
TrustMail [40] presents an email scoring system that can identify good mes-
sages based on the reputation of the individuals who sent those messages.
TrustMail extends the basic premises of whitelisting and social network
based ltering. A user is allowed to assign \reputation" or \trust" rating
to the people he knows i.e. can only assign ratings to people with whom
he is connected. This results in large reputation network with thousands of
interconnected users. TrustMail uses an individual user's personal view of
the network and applies a recursive algorithm to surmise a reputation score
for the sender of an email message.
The real beauty of the system is that legitimate emails from the sender
previously unknown to the recipient can receive high scores due to intercon-
nected social network. Thus, TrustMail helps in identifying good messages
that might otherwise be blurry in the unwanted spam messages. On the
negative side, TrustMail imposes a burden on the users to create an initial
set of reputation. Furthermore, inferring the score of email sender for every
single message consumes valuable resources of the email servers.
SNARE
SNARE (Spatiotemporal Network-level Automatic Reputation Engine) [43]
is a sender reputation based email classication system. SNARE infers the
reputation of an email sender using lightweight network-level features, with-
out deep packet inspection i.e. without looking at the contents of a message.
SNARE examines lightweight network-level features; such as the dis-
tance in IP space to other email senders or the geographic distance between
sender and receiver, to distinguish spammers from legitimate senders. In
other words, SNARE classies senders based on how they are communicat-
ing, rather than who the senders are (i.e., their IP addresses). SNARE focus
on lightweight features, since they do not require deep packet inspection of
large amount of emails from a single IP address and can be gathered without
looking at the message's content.
Since SNARE is based on lightweight network-level features; it can scale
better and operate on higher trac rates. Furthermore, SNARE is capa-
ble of achieving accuracy comparable to existing static IP blacklists and
classies email senders as spammers or legitimate users with about a 70%
detection rate having less than 0.3% false positives.
However, due to the lack of authentication and non-repudiation features
in SNARE and other trust and reputation solutions make them vulnerable to
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identity spoong, false accusation and collusion attacks. In addition to this,
these solutions consume extra resources of email servers on email reception
and ltering. In contrast, LENS can reject unwanted email trac during
the SMTP transaction.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter outlined the existing approaches to combat spam and discussed
their advantages and disadvantages. There is no silver bullet against spam
and spammers always nd a way to get around whatever anti-spam lters
are in place. In short, the common state-of-the-art strategy used today
only lters spam at the recipient's edge, after it has traversed the network.
This imposes a non-negligible cost on network operators in terms of band-
width and infrastructure. On the other hand, content-based ltering which
is one of the most widely adopted defense mechanism has turned the spam
problem into a message classication problem. Recently, there have been
some attempts to mitigate spam by exploiting trust embedded in social net-
works. These solutions propose a zero false-positive mechanism for vetting
emails sent from within the social circle of a user. However, emails coming
from outside this circle still need to be tested by noisy and unreliable spam
lters. The remainder of this thesis will present LENS, a new spam preven-
tion framework that extends the trust infrastructure to provide spam-free
communication beyond the social network of a recipient. Furthermore, the
proposed solution will lter spam during the SMTP transactions to save
bandwidth and infrastructural costs.
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Chapter 3
LENS Architecture and
Design
Existing spam prevention solutions mainly focus on detection of spam and
the spammers that are responsible for that spam. Every now and then
new solutions are proposed to detect spam. However, the spammers also
make improvisations, which have resulted in a continuous battle between
the spammers and the anti-spam community. Instead of detecting spam,
LENS mainly focuses on accepting legitimate emails from legitimate users.
This is realized by the selection of legitimate users (community members in
a close social circle of a user or socially distant trusted users called GKs) in
a legitimate (MS ).
Figure 3.1: LENS Architecture
LENS comprises of four main components; 1) community formation, 2)
trust management, 3) GK selection and 4) spam report handler, discussed
in the following sections (gure 3.1). All these components run on a MS
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along with the Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) and SMTP server. This chapter
discusses the basic design goals of LENS followed by the discussion of LENS
core components.
3.1 Design Goals
From the outset, we seek a solution that works well with the current, en-
trenched system. This means that the system follows several design princi-
ples:
1. Simple and ecient design: The simpler LENS is in terms of
usability and design, the more eectively the system can be used and
adopted. Since the motive is only to ght spam, there is no need for
a very complex and robust cryptographic solution with substantially
high infrastructure cost.
2. Decentralized solution: Usually, a centralized solution would be
dicult to scale. Hence, in LENS every user works out individually
to form his community and select his GKs.
3. Knowledge of the network: A user cannot obtain full information
about the global properties of the whole social network, such as the
network diameter, central nodes and node degree distribution. The
LENS design does not rely on full knowledge of the network.
4. Privacy of community list information: Privacy of the commu-
nity list of each user must always be protected against any external
(i.e., outside the community) threats and they (i.e., lists) should not
be exchanged freely at the time of community formation. Each indi-
vidual node is not allowed to possess too much information about the
network, which may induce privacy and security black-holes.
5. Incremental deployability/backward compatibility: LENS should
be able to integrate easily into the current SMTP servers. Inevitably,
when deployed, some users will adopt LENS before others. The de-
ployment of LENS should not worsen the spam problem for those
who have not adopted it. Until every user is familiar with LENS,
it is better to run it complementarily with the existing spam lters
(content-based ltering, blacklisting, whitelisting ...etc.). The users
who will fully adopt LENS should get its full benets; while others
would prot according to the extent of their adoption. Nevertheless,
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LENS should be backward compatible and should perfectly co-exist
with the existing spam protection techniques.
3.2 Mail Server's Responsibilities
The MS is responsible for running LENS on behalf of the email users. Each
MS may serve hundreds and thousands of email users depending on the size
of the organization. It is assumed that each email user can explicitly control
his community (friends and FoFs) and can give feedback by reporting spam
emails. All the remaining functionality of LENS is handled transparently
by the MS.
MSs running LENS are assumed to be legitimate with an extended val-
idation certicate issued from a Trusted Certication Authority (CA) [35].
Most well-known webmail providers and websites tend to have certicates
with extended validation of a domain's organization identity, so this require-
ment is not excessive. Furthermore, if a CA or its certicate is hacked, this
will result in compromising all the communication to and from the website
or MS. In such a scenarios spam will be of least concern. Discussion on such
attacks and its defense is beyond the scope of this thesis. These certicates
are used during server authentication (x 3.7) to prove that the MS is legiti-
mate. All the authentication requests associated with invalid certicates are
ignored.
3.2.1 Legitimate MS and Botnets
In email networks there are mainly two ways to spam; a) human spamming,
where a spammer creates an account (lets say on Gmail) and use it to send
spam, b) using network of compromised and infected PCs (botnets) to send
spams. Any good spamming model is based on cost free methods in terms
of human and infrastructural resources. Majority of spam originates from
botnets [36, 43] and according to [9, 12] around 80 to 85% of all email spam
is produced by 6 to 10 botnets only.
It is hard, if not impossible, for bots or malicious users to reside in a valid
and legitimate MS. The reason is that the addition of email users is strictly
moderated in companies, private institutes and universities. Furthermore,
all the major webmail providers run bot detectors against non-human au-
tomatic account creation. However, any one can create a large number of
accounts on webmail providers like Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail and GMX etc.
Our previous assumption, that all the users within any certied MS are
considered to be legitimate, might raise the question of human spamming;
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since a human spammer will be able to create dummy accounts on webmail
providers without any nancial cost. In reality this is not the case due to
the following reasons:
Webmail / Internet-service providers Email sending limit
Gmail 500 recipients per message with web and 100
using email client software
Hotmail 100 recipients per day
Yahoo 100 emails or recipients per hour
Lycos max 25 recipients per message and max 250
emails per day
AOL 100 recipients per message or 500 recipients
per connection
Verizon 100 recipients per email and 500 emails
(recipients) per hour
Comcast 1000 recipients per day
EarthLink 1000 recipients per day
Cablevision/Optimum (OOL) 50 recipients at one time
Road Runner 1,000 recipients per day per IP
AT&T Yahoo 100 recipients per email message
Charter 50 recipients / emails per hour
Table 3.1: Email sending limit by major webmail and Internet service
providers.
 Creating and running a spamming account over Yahoo, Hotmail and
Gmail requires human eort and all of this will incur cost which is
inhibitive to the spamming model.
 Almost all the webmail and Internet service providers impose an email
sending limit. Exceeding the limit, results in blocking of an email ac-
count for a certain amount of time [2]. Table 3.1 lists the email send-
ing limit of some of the major Internet service and webmail providers.
Apart from imposing limits on sending emails, webmail providers also
block email accounts for a certain time if the email contains a large
number of non-existent or broken addresses that bounce back on failed
delivery.
 When a MS is certied (just like any web-server) by a Trusted Certi-
cation Authority it shows that the MS belongs to a legitimate owner
or at least the identity of the MS's owner becomes visible, making it
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easy to take legal action against the owner or blacklist the MS. Invest-
ing in infrastructure or becoming visible has never been a choice for
the spammer.
Scale of human spamming is not signicant compared to botnets. There-
fore, studying the impact of human spamming is not a focus of this thesis,
and it will be part of our future work. LENS addresses the problem of non-
legitimate/human-spammer node by maintaining a trust rating (see x 3.4)
for each user to ensure its legitimacy and dierentiate between legitimate
and illegitimate users.
3.3 Community Formation
Many of our important decisions in daily life are based on the information
provided by our network of friends. Therefore, the reliability of our decisions
depends on the trustworthiness of our social network.
A number of studies about social networks have presented measures of
the closeness of a community. They have shown that these measures can
be used to distinguish empirically observed social networks from non-social
networks [33, 61, 62]. The most distinctive property of a social network is its
tendency to form clusters. For example, if A knows B and C i.e. B and C
are connected through A, then the likelihood of B knowing C is considerably
higher than a random network with a similar degree of distribution.
Figure 3.2: Community structure (friends, FoFs) of user \1".
In LENS, the social components of a community consist of two levels,
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namely friends of the users and his friends-of-friends (FoFs). Adding a friend
roughly corresponds to the notion that \User A trusts his friend B not to
send him spam and vice versa". Triadic closure is supported by adding FoFs
into the community.
Figure 3.2 depicts the community structure for a user. Users can receive
all the messages from his community directly into his inbox. The formation
of a social community is a simple two-step process.
1. Adding Friends: The rst step starts with the initiation of a friend
request. Anyone can request anyone else to become his/her friend.
Addition of a friend is the very basic yet extremely crucial step in
LENS. It is assumed that only two users having a mutual trust on
each other will enter into a friend relationship (like in MSN, Skype or
Facebook). System security and defense against attacks from malicious
users depends on the fact that friend's relationship is always formed
between two legitimate users having proven record of social interaction.
Once the two users add each other as friends, an entry is made in
CommList (discussed below) with the user ID and label \F".
2. Adding FoF: The idea of FoF addition is that there will be no ex-
change of friend lists among the friends. Instead a user can suggest
his mutually exclusive friends to add each other into their communities
as FoF. For instance (gure 3.3), user \2" has two mutually exclusive
friends so \2" will suggest both \3" and \1" to join the FoF relation-
ship. If both \1" and \3" accept the suggestion they will add each
other into their communities. Once two users add each other as FoF,
an entry is made in their CommList with the ID of the added user,
label \FoF" and the ID of the referring mutual friend.
By the end of Step 2, all the users will have a community structure
with friends and FoFs. All the communities consist of only 2 levels of so-
cial components which are considerably close. During the entire process
of community formation, only local information of direct neighbors is used
and the process is carried out in a decentralized manner at each individual
user level. Furthermore there is no exchange of friend lists among the users
without consensus so that the privacy of each user can be protected. By
design, community formation is a selective process and involves certain hu-
man involvement to prevent any unnecessary addition in communities and
preserve high level of privacy.
Figure 3.4 shows a cross platform and email client independent com-
munity formation client which has been developed in PyQT to handle the
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Figure 3.3: Community formation of user \1".
process of community formation. The community formation client provides
the functionality to add friends, view community, view pending requests,
accept/reject the request received and send suggestions to mutual friends.
Figure 3.4: Cross platform community formation client in PyQT.
Community List (CommList)
CommList is a primary data structure that contains the records of the com-
munity members for each user in the system. This list is kept as a plain
text le on the MS and maintains entries of the community users, either
as friend or FoFs (see gure 3.2). CommList can only be modied by the
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respective user and it is also visible (accessible) to the MS that host the
user and his CommList. The MSs are authorized to query the CommList of
a recipient during the GK selection process.
3.4 Trust Management
In order to ensure that illegitimate users are not selected as GKs, LENS
maintains a system wide trust rating (TR) for each email user on the MS.
The main goal of TR is to assign a rating to each user known to the MS
and to use these ratings to decide whether the user is legitimate or not.
Based on the MS's TR there are four dierent user types (UT ) i.e. le-
gitimate (LU), trusted (TU), new (NU) and illegitimate (IU). LU are non-
spammers with a clean track record of spam-free communication and TR
>= L (trust rating threshold of legitimate user). TU as the name suggests
are the users trusted by the MS to be legitimate/non-spammers. They have
TR >= L and theMS has veried the uniqueness of their identities. NU are
newly registered users with the MS with 0 <= TR <L. IU are the identied
spammers with negative TR.
Assignment of TR falls in two main categories as follows.
Direct TR
Direct TR is the manual assignment of TR to a user by the admin(s) of
the MS. Direct TR have priority over other methods of TR and it overrides
the existing values of TR. Direct TR is more practical for small-medium
size, strictly moderated MSs of companies, private institutes and univer-
sities, where the admins have direct trust on the users (for example users
like Uni professor or company's GM are trusted not to be spammer). For
big web-mail providers and ISPs the TR of each user should be computed
automatically.
Automated TR
Automated TR is based on user voting. Analysis of spamming nodes shows
that they exhibit one way communication i.e. they are always on the sending
end [22, 26]. If A sends email to B, then it can be regarded as trusting B, or
voting for B [26]. Trust Management component of LENS can be applied at
the SMTP envelop (MAIL FROM: or RCPT TO:), where it can compute TR
according to the algorithm summarized below. The TRs are maintained by
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the MS for each of its user.
Algorithm 1: Automated TR
OFFLINE
# Domain = D, UserType = UT, TrustRating = TR, Distinct Domains = DD
1: # infer votes from existing data
2: For Each inbound email from sender i to recipient j
3: if (email == Legitimate)
4: if (j has no votes from i)
5: TRj +=1
6: if (j has no votes from Di)
7: DDj +=1
8:
9: if (TRj >= L && DDj >= D)# reach votes threshold for Distinct Users & Domains
10: UT = Legitimate
12:# indentity uniqueness test independent of voting
13: For Each j with (UT == Legitimate)
14: status = verify_identity_uniqueness(j)
15: if (status == True)
16: UT = Trusted
ONLINE
# Processing live email data after processing existing data
1: For Each inbound email from sender i to receiver j
2: run step 3 to 16 of Initialization block
The automatic TRs are computed in two modes i.e. oine and online.
The only dierence between these two modes is the stream of data they
operate on, other than that there is no dierence in the functionality. In the
oine mode the TRs are computed by mining the existing server logs of the
email communication. Whereas, the online mode operates on the live email
data streams to calculate the TRs. In order to gain higher TR the users are
required to gather votes. In other words, the TR of a recipient increases on
the reception of legitimate inbound emails.
The automated TR algorithm observes each inbound email from the
sender. On the reception of a legitimate email (legitimacy of the vote is
dependent on the legitimacy of the email) the TR of the recipient will be
increased by one. Multiple emails from the same sender will have no eect
on a recipient's TR. A sender can only be counted once for any particular
recipient. When the recipient will receive legitimate email from L distinct
senders belonging to D distinct domains, the UT of the recipient will be
upgraded to LU (legitimate).
After becoming LU, a user has to pass the identity uniqueness verication
in order to become TU (trusted). During this verication the user is binded
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with his unique identity such as his mobile number using challenge response
authentication. Facebook also veries the uniqueness of user accounts by
binding them with unique mobile numbers. A potential attack on trust
ranking has been discussed in x 6 along with the means to neutralize it.
3.5 GK Selection
GK selection is a user transparent process carried out by the GK Selec-
tion component of the MS running LENS. This means that the user being
selected as GK is also not aware, and has no control, of it being a GK. Dur-
ing the selection process, LENS selects good actors (legitimate and trusted
users with good reputation) as GK and transparently uses them as a means
to vouch users outside the community of the recipient R for communication.
To maintain a reliable trust structure, a GK is only authorized to vouch for
the users in its own community. On successful completion of the selection
procedure, both the (R) and his GK receive their respective keys. GK's key
is used (by GK's MS ) to issue vouchers to the GK's community members
so that they can communicate with R. On the receiving end, R's key is used
to verify the vouchers. In order to keep LENS eective and scalable, the
goal of GK selection process is to select minimum number of GKs for
maximum coverage.
Let us consider all the email users as a connected network and visualize
it as a graph G = (V, E), with email users as vertices (V ) and their rela-
tionships (i.e. friends) as edges (E ). For every recipient node in G, a subset
S' of V (i.e. GK nodes) is required such that nearly every vertex not in
the social community of the recipient node lies within at least one of the
communities of the member of S', and the size of S' is desired to be as small
as possible.
The total email users today are more than 1.4 billion [3]. Finding a
smallest subset of S' with maximum coverage raises the scalability question.
This is also similar to the minimum dominating set problem [38], which is
a classical NP-complete problem in computational complexity theory. The
only dierence is that a GK is connected to its community instead of direct
neighbors.
In this thesis the classical dominating set or distributed dominating set
approximation is not used to select the GKs for two main reasons. First,
a common set of nodes to serve as GKs for the whole population are not
preferred. The reason is that these common GKs will have too much in-
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formation about everyone in the network and would become privacy and
security weak points. The second reason is that a further consideration of
the communication patterns revealed that one cannot expect everyone on
the planet to communicate randomly with each other. The probability ac-
tually decreases with an increase in the social distance. Instead of working
on a global provisioning of optimal GK for the entire email network, this
section will discuss and present a scalable approximation.
One of the design constraints of LENS is that a user cannot obtain infor-
mation about the global properties of the social network. The best approach
here would be to restrict a user to his personal community information.
The GK selection procedure of LENS consists of the following three stages,
covering all the communication scenarios for legitimate emails.
Figure 3.5: GK selection in adjacent communities.
3.5.1 Stage 1 - GK selection in adjacent communities:
The GK selection process for any recipient (R) starts with its adjacent
communities as described below.
1. Request: The MS will use R's FoF (boundary user) to nd the
locally optimal GKs (gure 3.5). R's MS will simply request all FoFs
of the community to send their suggestions for good GKs.
2. Suggestion: The MS of the FoF will suggest a potential GK from
FoF's friends by selecting the user with the largest number of friends
(outside R's community). The MS of the FoF will also inform the
potential GK about R. For instance in gure 3.5, which depicts the
selection of GKs by a FoF of R, user \38" suggests \5" as the locally
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optimal GK to \1" instead of \12", since \5" is the friend with biggest
community (and who is outside the community of \1"). R will choose
the set of GKs that provide the best coverage. At the end of Stage 1,
users within 5 hops of the R can send emails to it.
3. Verication of Legitimacy: This is the last and most important
step of GK selection process. This step ensures that the GK is legit-
imate (details of this are covered in x 3.7). As a result of this step,
a RSA based key pair (PK and SK ) is generated for the GK. PK
is shared with the R and the SK is use to issue vouchers to all the
community members of the GK. These members will use the issued
vouchers for communicating with the R (see gure 3.6).
Figure 3.6: GK verication and voucher distribution.
After the stage 1, all the users within a social radius (level or hops) of 5
would be able to send emails to the recipient with an assurance of being free
from spam. According to the small world property of social network, any
two users can be connected with a small number of hops. This phenomenon
is also popularly known as six-degree of separations [69], indicating that
everyone is on average six steps away in social networks. According to
latest studies on Facebook social graphs the degree of separation between
any two Facebook users is even less than 5 hops [18, 70]. This suggests that
if the email network exhibits a social network behavior, the recipient would
be highly reachable. Nevertheless, distant users having a social distance
greater than 5 are covered in stage 2 of the GK selection process. PKList
36
3.5. GK Selection
and VoucherList (discussed below) are maintained at each user'sMS to store
the PKs and vouchers. To communicate with each recipient outside of its
social circle, a user would have to maintain a voucher for that recipient.
Similarly, a GK issues a single voucher for all the recipients outside of his
social circle for whom he is vouching.
Public-key List (PKList)
Public-key list or the PKList is maintained for the recipients and enlists the
authorized GKs for the R along with its PKs. Any single entry in PKList
contains the public-key and the identity of the selected GK (PK;GKID).
PKList can only be accessed and modied by the R's MS. Even the Rs have
no access or control on the PKLists. This is because by design, the GK
selection is a system process completely transparent to the users. If, for any
reason, the GK is revoked, its corresponding entry is also deleted from the
PKList.
VoucherList
As a result of GK selection a RSA-based key pair (PK, SK ) is generated for
theGK. TheMS of theGK use the SK to issue voucher (((UserID)hash)Sign SK)
to all the members of the GK's community. These vouchers are added to the
VoucherList of the users (GK's community members), along with the IDs of
the R and theGK (< RID1; RID2; ::: >;GKID; V oucher[((UserID)hash)Sign SK ]),
to use for communicating with the R. A single voucher issued by the GK,
to each of his community user, will work for all the Rs for which the GK is
authorized to vouch.
3.5.2 Stage 2 - GK selection beyond adjacent communities:
After stage 1, the GK selection procedure of LENS can be easily extended
to select GK in distant (beyond adjacent) communities. R's MS will send
a request to the selected GK's MSs to help them look for GKs from their
adjacent communities. As a result of this request, the GKs will use their
FoFs to nd new locally optimal GKs and send their suggestions back to
R. (see gure 3.7). This process creates the second outer ring and extends
reachability of R to users which are up to 8 hops away. This can clearly
be extended to create additional rings of trust, but our implementation
stops at Stage 2. While selecting GKs at Stage 2, it is important to ensure
that the users selected as GK are not included in an inner ring. When the
CommList is available directly, this is straightforward. The GK selection for
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higher levels must also consider the small world property of social networks
[69], in order to avoid random walks on the social graph.
Figure 3.7: GK selection beyond adjacent communities.
3.5.3 Stage 3 - GK selection for new communication:
One of the reasons that email is so great is because anyone can contact
anyone else. People get legitimate emails from new people everyday. LENS
provides spam free email communication to distant and new users as follows.
Instead of extending GK selection to the entire network, LENS restricts it
only to the social levels covered in stage 1 and 2. If a user wants to send
an email to R for the rst time, which is not only outside its community
but there is also no GK for R within its community, LENS will perform the
following two steps.
1. Announcement: announce the sender (S ) to R that wants to com-
municate and start the legitimacy verication process.
2. Verication of Legitimacy: start the legitimacy verication process
(see x 3.7 for details) to prove that S is not a spammer. As a result of
this process, R will add S as its GK. S's MS will further issue vouchers
to his entire community and they will be able to use these vouchers to
communicate with R.
This process is only performed once at the start of a new communication.
After the S is veried as a GK, not only the sender but his entire community
can send email to the R. Therefore, instead of having a GK for the entire
network in LENS a GK can be selected on the y after stage 2. The results
in x 7.2 show that the need for stage 3 GK selection is quite infrequent.
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Further, the results in x 7.3 shows that stage 3 only adds a negligible delay
of 0.5 to 1.5 secs in email transmission.
RE: received 85% of the emails correctly by utilizing just its social net-
work (friends and FoFs) [39]. With the GKs, LENS enhances its reliable
and spam free delivery of emails beyond social network. Success of LENS
depends on the successful formation of social communities and continuous
extension of GK selection between the email users. Users having a larger
social community would benet more from LENS as compared to isolated
and less socially connected users.
3.6 Spam Report Handler
Spam reports are handled by the Spam report handler. In LENS, by design,
only reports from trusted (TU) are weighted. This design decision has been
taken to prevent spammers from falsely reporting non-spammers as spam-
mers. When a user will receive a spam, he will report to his MS that the
sender is a spammer. Upon receiving a spam report, the spam report handler
will register the report against the TR of the reporter. Once the handler
receives the RT (report threshold) reports from distinct trusted users, it
assigns a negative TR to the spammer. Furthermore, if the spammer is not
a local user on the MS, the handler will add the oending user to the revo-
cation list thereby preventing further spamming. Handling of spam report
is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Spam Report Handling
# Domain = D, UserType = UT, TrustRating = TR
# SRij = # of SpamReports by user i of user j
# Ij = # unique reports against j
# RT = threshold
ForEach SpamReport of Spammer s by Reporter r
if(UTr == trusted && SRrj ==0)
Is++
if (Is >= RT)
if (s = localuser)
TRs = negative
UTs = illegitimate
delete s from CommList, VoucherList, PKList
else:
Add s to Revocation list as IU
After malicious users (local or remote) are identied and marked as il-
legitimate, their associated entries in CommList, PKList and VoucherList
are also terminated from the MS. This means that if a GK is malicious, its
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associated entries from the PKList of the recipients and VoucherList of the
community members will be removed.
3.7 Legitimacy verication in GK Selection
Legitimacy verication is one of the most signicant part of GK selection
process. This protocol ensures that the R can trust the GK to be legitimate.
With this protocol a RSA based key-pair (PK and SK ) is generated for the
GK. PK is shared with the R's MS and the GK's MS uses the SK to issue
vouchers to his community members as a vouching mechanism to send emails
to the R.
Based on the trust rating -TR (please refer to x 3.4 for details on trust
management) there are four dierent user types (UT) i.e. legitimate (LU),
trusted (TU), new (NU) and illegitimate (IU). The following sections explore
two variations of the protocol based on the dierence of the locations of the
R and its GK.
3.7.1 Recipient and GK on dierent MS
If the R and the GK belong to dierent MSs, legitimacy is veried in two
steps. First, server authentication is carried out based on extended val-
idated certicate issued by a trusted certication authority to verify that
both the R's and the GK's servers are legitimate and un-tempered. Second,
the TR of the user at his MS is veried to ensure that the user is not illegit-
imate/spammer. Following is the description of our legitimacy verication
protocol. In LENS, by design, GK's MS will always initiate the protocol.
Figure 3.8: Legitimacy verication in GK Selection.
 R's MS and its GK's MS agrees on the stage of GK selection.
 GK's MS picks the UT of the GK (based on the TR), signs the UT
using his private signature key (SGK MS) and sends the UT, signature
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and certicate (CertGK MS) which was issued by the trusted CA to
the R's MS.
 R's MS veries the signature of the GK's MS, based on the certicate
issued by the trusted CA. For GK selection of stage 1 & 2 the UT of
the GK must be legitimate or trusted, else the verication will fail. In
stage 3, the UT of the GK can also be new (relaxation of UT new is
only given in stage 3, with email sending limit).
 R's MS picks the UT of the R (based on the TR), signs the UT using
his private signature key (SR MS) and sends the UT, signature and
his certicate (CertR MS), issued by the trusted CA to GK's MS.
 GK's MS veries the signature of the R's MS. The UT of the R can
be new, legitimate or trusted. Only limitation on the UT is that the
R must not be illegitimate.
 If the GK is selected for the rst time, the GK's MS will generate RSA
based key-pair (PK, SK ) for the GK and send the PK to the R's MS.
If the GK was already selected before for some other R, key-pair (PK,
SK ) will already exist for the GK and the MS will only send the PK
to the R's MS.
 Once the GK has the SK, GK's MS will use the SK to issue a
voucher (((UserID)hash)Sign SK) to all the users of GK's commu-
nity. These vouchers are added to the VoucherList of the users, along
with the IDs of the R and the GK (< RID; ::: >;GKID, and the
V oucher[((UserID)hash)Sign SK ]) and would be used later for commu-
nicating with the R. If a user is selected as GK for multiple Rs, its com-
munity users will not need multiple vouchers for each R. One voucher
(from the GK ) is enough to communicate with all the Rs. Only the
R's ID is appended to the existing voucher entry in the VoucherList
(< RID1; RID2; ::: >;GKID; V oucher[((UserID)hash)Sign SK ]).
 On receiving the PK of the GK, R's MS will add new entry (PK,
GKID) to the PKList of the R. In the GK selection stage 3, if the UT
of the GK is new, the R's MS will enforce a rate limit on the number
of emails per day from the GK and his community user. Later, if
the UT of the GK upgrades to legitimate or trusted, the R' MS will
remove email sending limit after the verication of updated UT. This
email limit is applied to restrict the number of spam messages sent by
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a user before being identied as malicious. On the other hand, it will
allow new honest users to send email outside their community.
In LENS, the use of RSA based key-pair (PK, SK) has many advantages
over using symmetric keys between the GKs and their Rs. A GK requires a
single key-pair, irrespective of the number of Rs it has. LENS evaluations
x 7.2 reveal that a R on average requires only 10 to 31 GKs i.e. a R has
to maintain only 10 to 31 PKs on average for his selected GKs. Moreover,
the GK does not have to re-issue vouchers to his community members for
every single R. A single voucher is sucient for all the R for whom the
GK is vouching. In LENS, the PKs are distributed directly by the MS of
the GK. Hence, LENS does not require a public key infrastructure (PKI )
for key management, distribution and verication and by doing so it avoids
considerable overhead.
3.7.2 Recipient and GK on same MS
If the recipient and a GK are hosted by the same MS, the protocol works
exactly the same without any need for server authentication (since all the
messages are exchanged internally).
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Chapter 4
LENS Prototype and Email
Processing
Based on the conceptual system design introduced in chapter 3, this chap-
ter presents the prototype implementation that integrates LENS with the
existing email infrastructure. Furthermore, this chapter also explores the
processing of emails with LENS and how spam can be prevented from trans-
mission. Finally, this chapter concludes with the discussion on how LENS
can be incrementally deployed.
Figure 4.1: Standard email processing with SMTP.
4.1 Integration with Email Infrastructure
Figure 4.1 depicts the ow of an email i.e. from message creation, transport
to delivery. Mail user agent (MUA), the email client of the sender, submits
the email to its MS using SMTP. The sender's MS will look up the desti-
nation's mail exchanger record (MX ) in the DNS server. The DNS server
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nds the highest preferenceMS for the recipient and reports the name of the
MS by returning a MX resource record. After this point, a TCP connection
is established between the sender's and the recipient's MSs and the sender's
MS sends the VRFY:, MAIL FROM: and RCPT TO: commands (one by one) to
the recipient. With successful acknowledgment from the receiver side, the
complete email (header and the body) is sent, and the TCP connection is
released. The mail delivery agent (MDA) delivers the accepted email to a
server for local mail delivery. Once delivered to the local MS, the mail is
stored for batch retrieval by authenticated mail clients (MUAs) using IMAP
or POP.
To use LENS for email processing during the SMTP transactions, ad-
ditional steps are needed for its integration into the existing email infras-
tructure. This section covers the steps required to append vouchers on the
email envelop (RCPT TO:) for the outbound email. It further presents how
the vouchers can be extracted and veried by the receiving MTA. Without
any modication to the existing SMTP specications, LENS based email
lter (using CommList and vouchers issued by the GK ) runs as an inde-
pendent daemon (like spamd for SpamAssassin: spamassassin.apache.org)
to monitor the SMTP transaction and based on the results takes dierent
actions.
This implementation used the Mutt mail client, the MailAvenger SMTP
daemon [5], and Postx [7] as an MTA. Postx is a widely used open source
MTA that is available for all major UNIX-based operating systems. For the
processing of inbound emails MailAvenger has been used [5]. MailAvenger
is a MTA independent SMTP daemon that allows application of lters on
an email during the SMTP transaction, which meets our requirements. Fig-
ure 4.2 gives an overview of the processing of inbound and outbound emails.
4.1.1 Integration on the sending side
LENS utilizes Postx as an MTA for the processing of outbound emails.
In Postx, SMTP transactions are implemented in the smtp loop() func-
tion within the smtp proto.c le. The following code listing outlines the
functions denition of smtp loop().
static int smtp_loop(SMTP_STATE *state, NOCLOBBER int
send_state, NOCLOBBER int recv_state)
With respect to LENS, the relevant part of the smtp loop() function is
the realization of RCPT TO:. The following code excerpt outlines the original
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Figure 4.2: An overview of the processing of inbound and outbound emails
with LENS.
code fragment that handle the RCPT TO: prior to the integration of LENS.
case SMTP_STATE_RCPT:
rcpt = request->rcpt_list.info + send_rcpt;
REWRITE_ADDRESS(session->scratch2, rcpt->address);
QUOTE_ADDRESS(session->scratch, vstring_str(session->scratch2));
vstring_sprintf(next_command, "RCPT TO:<%s>",
vstring_str(session->scratch));
For the integration of LENS with Postx on the sending side, the pro-
cessing of RCPT TO: command has to be customized in two aspects. In the
rst step, the source code is modied to check the CommList of the sender
if it has an entry for the recipient. If the recipient is in the sender's com-
munity the RCPT TO: command will be executed without any modication
as follows (couple of lines are skipped in the listing for simplicity).
case SMTP_STATE_RCPT:
rcpt = request->rcpt_list.info + send_rcpt;
REWRITE_ADDRESS(session->scratch2, rcpt->address);
QUOTE_ADDRESS(session->scratch, vstring_str(session->scratch2));
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//read the CommList
f=fopen(commlist_path,"r");
while ( fgets( buffer, 512, f) != NULL ) /* read a line */
{
word = strtok(buffer, " ?");
if(strcmp(word,vstring_str(session->scratch)) == 0)
{
// if recipient is in the CommList
InCommList = 'T';
break;
}
}
fclose (f);
if (InCommList == 'T')
{
//execute the RCPT TO without any modifications
vstring_sprintf(next_command, "RCPT TO:<%s>",
vstring_str(session->scratch));
}
If the community lookup fails, the second step is to look for a valid
voucher issued, to the sender, by the trusted GK's MS to communicate
with the recipient. Upon the successful retrieval, the resulting voucher is
appended to RCPT TO: as an additional parameter.
if (InCommList == 'T')
vstring_sprintf(next_command, "RCPT TO:<%s>",
vstring_str(session->scratch));
else
{
// look for the Voucher
f=fopen(Voucherlist_path,"r");
if(strcmp(word,vstring_str(session->scratch)) == 0)
{
InVoucherList = 'T';
// Voucher exist, pick the GKID and Voucher
46
4.1. Integration with Email Infrastructure
break;
}
fclose (f);
}
if (InVoucherList == 'T')
{
#Append GKID and Voucher as Additional Parameters to RCPT TO
vstring_sprintf(next_command, "RCPT TO:<%s> voucher=%v gk=%s",
vstring_str(session->scratch),voucher,gk);
}
The additional arguments to vstring sprintf() function reects the
appending of additional parameter to RCPT TO: command. At the end of
step two, if there is no valid voucher for the recipient, the GK selection
module will be invoked to execute GK selection in stage 3 using system()
call. The system() function is part of the C standard library and can be
used to execute an external program. Here it is used to minimize changes
to the Postx source-code for this prototype. On successful completion of
GK selection in stage 3, the withheld RCPT TO: is sent out after appending
it with the newly acquired voucher. The owchart in gure 4.3 represents
the processing of outbound RCPT TO: command.
Figure 4.3: The processing of outbound RCPT TO: command.
In order to maintain compatibility with non-LENS servers at the receiv-
ing side, the execution of GK selection (stage 3) should be skipped after the
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failure of voucher lookup and a normal RCPT TO: command should be used.
4.1.2 Integration on the receiving side
As stated above, LENS use MailAvenger for the processing of inbound
emails. The main advantage of MailAvenger is that, by default, it sup-
ports direct access to the SMTP transactions. This allows application of
lters on an email during the SMTP transaction, as per our requirements.
In MailAvenger, the core working of SMTP is handled in the smtpd.c le
and the RCPT TO: functionality is implemented in the cmd rcpt() function.
void smtpd::cmd_rcpt (str cmd, str arg)
The processing of inbound RCPT TO: command can be broken down in
two steps. In the rst step, a community based lter is applied to check
if the sender is in the recipient's community. This is implemented in the
CommFilter() function. The function takes in the sender's and recipient's
addresses as an argument and returns a string \yes" or \no".
str CommFilter (str recipient, str sender)
{
char commlist_path[512] = "";
char buffer[512];
str word;
strcat(commlist_path, recipient);
FILE *f;
f= fopen(commlist_path,"r");
while ( fgets( buffer, 512, f) != NULL )
{
word = strtok(buffer, " ?\n");
if(word == sender)
return "yes";
}
fclose (f);
return "no";
}
The result of this community lookup is then exported as an environment
variable COMMUNITY FILTER in the same le (smtpd.c) as follows.
envp->push_back (strbuf ("COMMUNITY_FILTER=") << communityfilter);
48
4.1. Integration with Email Infrastructure
MailAvenger allows users and administrators of a MS to use shell scripts
for dening their ltering rules. To access properties of inbound mails in
these scripts, for example the sender's address or the results of an SPF check,
MailAvenger exports various environment variables. The same approach is
used for LENS, more precisely the result of the community lter and the
voucher verication are exported to a shell script using environment vari-
ables.
If the community lookup fails, the next step is to extract the voucher
of an inbound email from RCPT TO: and verify it. The extract substr()
function is used to extract the voucher appended as additional parameter
to the inbound RCPT TO: command.
str addr = extract_addr (arg, "to:");
str voucher = extract_substr (arg, 'V');
str gatekeeper = extract_substr (arg, 'G');
The function extract substr() has been dened in addrparse.C and
can be used to nd a substring of the string given as the rst parameter.
The parameter V and G denes that the voucher and GKID should be ex-
tracted, so extract substr() will search for the substring voucher= and
gk= in arg and return the values. These values are then passed on to the
verify voucher() function for the verication of the voucher.
if (voucher != "NULL")
{
IsVoucher = "yes"; //voucher exist
verify = verify_voucher(voucher, fromaddr, gatekeeper, addr);
if (verify == 1)
VoucherVrfy = "1";
else if (verify == -1)
VoucherVrfy = "-1";
else if (verify == 0)
VoucherVrfy = "0";
else if (verify == 2)
VoucherVrfy = "2";
}
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For the verication of vouchers, the verify voucher() function use
OpenSSL API to access standard implementation of public-key cryptosys-
tem (RSA) and hash (SHA-1) functions. The result of voucher verication
is then exported in two environment variables as follows.
envp->push_back (strbuf ("IS_VOUCHER=") << IsVoucher);
envp->push_back (strbuf ("IS_VOUCHER_VERIFIED=") << VoucherVrfy);
At the end of RCPT TO: processing, MailAvenger automatically execute
the script placed in the /etc/avenger/default le. Using the environment
variables, this script denes ltering rules to determine whether the emails
should be accepted or rejected. Alternatively the script can be placed in the
home directory of any user, for example in /home/shameed/.avenger/rcpt
for the user shameed. With this setup, the script is only executed for emails
which are addressed to the owner of that directory, whereas the rst setup
executes it for all incoming emails. Following is the example of the default
shell script used for LENS.
if [ $IS_VOUCHER = 'yes' ]; then
if [ $IS_VOUCHER_VERIFIED = '1' ]; then
accept "$SENDER has valid GK Voucher"
elif [ $IS_VOUCHER_VERIFIED = '2' ]; then
reject "$SENDER has UnAuthorized GK"
else
reject "$SENDER has invalid GK Voucher"
fi
elif [ $COMMUNITY_FILTER = 'yes' ]; then
accept "$SENDER is in the CommList of $RECIPIENT"
else
reject "$SENDER is not in the CommList of $RECIPIENT
and doesnt have valid voucher"
fi
The owchart in gure 4.4 represents the processing of inbound RCPT
TO: command.
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Figure 4.4: The processing of inbound RCPT TO: command.
4.1.3 Conclusion
The design of LENS allows an easy integration for the new adopters. For in-
bound mails, MailAvenger can be used to formulate rules that can eciently
access the community-based and voucher-based ltering. Furthermore, the
required changes to the source-code of Postx and Mail Avenger are mini-
mal.
4.2 Email Processing With LENS
With LENS, email processing (cf. gure 4.5) can fall into one of three
categories:
1. When a message is sent to any recipient within the community, the
recipient's MS will verify the sender against the recipient's CommList
and place the message in the mailbox.
2. If a message is sent to a recipient outside the sender's community,
the sender's MS will bind a voucher, from authorized GK along with
the message. On reception, the MS will verify the voucher using the
PK stored in PKList against the GKID and place the message in the
recipient's mailbox.
3. If a new message is intended for a recipient outside the sender's
community and with no voucher issued by anyGK , the sender's
MS will hold the message and start a GK selection procedure (stage
51
4.3. Prevention of Spam Transmission
3). On successful completion, the sender's MS will now bind a voucher
with the withheld message and send it out. At reception, the MS will
verify the voucher using the PK stored in PKList against the GKID
and place the message in the recipient's mailbox.
Figure 4.5: Email processing with LENS.
4.3 Prevention of Spam Transmission
One of the main contributions of LENS is that it prevents the transmission
of spam across the network. Let us consider that the sender's and recipient's
MS have already established a TCP connection. Now, when the sender's
MS will send the RCPT TO: command, it will also append the voucher
and issuing GK's ID (for e.g. RCPT TO: <example@abc.com>Voucher
= 1f2a91aa236d0012 GK=gk@example.com) as additional rcpt-parameters,
if the recipient is not in the sender's community (gure 4.5). At the recip-
ient's end, the MS veries if the sender is a community member or has a
valid voucher from an authorized GK. Failure of the verication results in
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the termination of the TCP connection by the recipient's MS and the trans-
mission of email (header and body) will not take place, thereby preventing
the unwanted message from being transmitted.
According to the current draft standard of SMTP [49] using additional
rcpt-parameters is optional and contemporary SMTP implementationsmust
support it as basic extension mechanisms. The SMTP server not obliged to
understand the additional rcpt-parameters simply ignores them.
Figure 4.6: Complementary LENS and existing spam lters
4.4 Incremental Deployment
It is easy to integrate LENS into current SMTP servers. Inevitably, when
deployed, some users will adopt LENS before others. Until every user is fa-
miliar with LENS, it will run complementarily with the existing spam lters.
See gure 5.4, after sender authentication LENS is rst to examine inbound
email. Incremental deployment will have four communication scenarios as
follows.
1. Sender and Recipient both have LENS : email processing will
follow the procedure discussed in x 4.2 (also see gure 4.5)
2. Only Sender has LENS : Sender will send an email as usual and
the MS on the recipient side will process the email with its existing
spam lters.
3. Only Recipient has LENS : after performing a check for existence
of community or voucher, LENS will pass the email to the existing
spam lters.
4. Both Sender and Recipient do not have LENS : emails will be
process according to the existing mechanisms deployed at the sender's
and recipient's MS.
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Based on our evaluations around 81%-89% (x 7.2) of the emails are from
the community members. With the increase in adaptation/deployment of
LENS, the user's community will grow and their reachability via the GKs
will increase. With global deployment LENS is envisioned to stop the trans-
mission of spam at the rst place. Even with partial deployment, the senders
and recipients deploying LENS will benet in two ways. First, all the emails
from the user's community and with valid GK vouchers will be processed
by LENS, which is signicantly ecient than SpamAssassin (see x 7.4). Sec-
ond, less number of emails will pass through existing content-based lters,
and avoid the chances of false positives and false negatives due to imprecise
content signatures. These benets will also help motivating the deployment
of LENS.
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Chapter 5
Complementary Email
Sender Authentication
SMTP does not authenticate sender address by default. Therefore, spam-
mers can easily launch a spam attack with forged from: addresses as if
they are from the recipient's community. To address this problem a new
crypto-based email sender authentication mechanism known as iSATS has
been developed as a minor contribution to this thesis. iSATS is comple-
mentary to LENS and provides a reliable way to bind the identity of a
legitimate sender to an email. The mechanism has made it reasonably hard
for a spammer to adopt or bypass the system without getting noticed.
LENS can also utilize SPF [75], for sender authentication. SPF is the
most adopted email sender authentication protocol eectively being used
in existing email systems. However, the advantage of iSATS over SPF is
that it forms a close system that strongly binds the sender's identity. This
makes it hard for spammers to adopt the system without becoming visible.
SPF on the other hand can be easily abused and according to [60] 20% of
the spamming domains have already adopted SPF. Nevertheless, iSATS is
proposed as a complementary service to LENS and it would be a design
choice for email service providers (or domain administration) to go with
iSATS or use other existing sender authentication schemes. The following
sections of this chapter discuss the iSATS protocol design, prototype and
evaluations.
5.1 iSATS Design
iSATS is a crypto-based email sender authentication system that operates
on the SMTP envelop, in particular on MAIL FROM: command, to perform
domain level authentication during the SMTP transaction. iSATS leverages
identity based signature (IBS ) using identity-based public key cryptography
(IBC ) [20, 27] to authenticate the identity of an email sender. Compared to
traditional public key cryptography, IBC eases the burden of managing and
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distributing public keys, since publicly available unique identities are used
as public keys.
iSATS requires a trusted authority (TA) also known as private key gener-
ator (PKG), responsible for issuing secret key (SK ) and system parameters.
The TA is also responsible to thoroughly verify the identity of a domain be-
fore issuing SK. This verication strongly binds the identity of the domain
owner to its domain and makes it hard for the spammer to adopt iSATS,
unless they are willing to give away their identity.
iSATS requires the sender's MTA to generate a signature using SK of
the domain and appends it with SMTP envelop (MAIL FROM:). This enables
the recipient's MTA to quickly authenticate the sender by verifying the
appended signature. Any invalid connection is terminated right away, saving
valuable resources both at the MTA and in the network. Unlike SPF and
DKIM, email forwarding and munging of message along the transit is not a
problem in iSATS.
Figure 5.1: The SMTP transactions where iSATS and LENS operates in-
dependently.
5.1.1 Basic requirements
From the outset, we sought a solution that works well with the current,
entrenched email system. This means that our proposed system should:
 Work as an optional addition to standard mail clients or servers, and
continue to support popular means of accessing mail (e.g. IMAP /
POP / Webmail).
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 Be incrementally deployable.
 Remains transparent to end users.
The functionality of iSATS can be divided into four steps: 1) setup, 2)
identity verication and secret key extraction, 3) signature generation and
4) signature verication. Each of these steps are discussed in the following
sections.
5.1.2 Setup
This step is executed only once in the beginning and marks the creation
of a whole IBC environment by a TA. The setup results in generation of
a Master Key and System Parameters. Master key is kept secret by the
TA and it is used to generate SK for the domains based on their identity.
System parameters on the other hand are publicly available.
Figure 5.2: The process of domain joining the iSATS.
5.1.3 Identity verication and secret key extraction
This step is initiated when any domain wants to become part of iSATS and
requests a SK (see gure 5.2). iSATS represents a closed system, in a sense
that domains are not automatically added to the system. In order for the
domains to get included into iSATS the domains would have to be veried by
the TA. iSATS is envisioned to provide extended validation of the domain's
identity. Identity verication with Extended Validation [35] provides high-
level of security to clearly identify a domain's organizational identity. This
will help bind the owner's identity to the identity of the domain and will
make misbehaving domains visible. Most well-known webmail providers
and websites tend to have SSL certicates with extended validation, so this
requirement is not excessive.
After identity verication, the TA will issue system parameters and a
SK corresponding to the domain name which is also its identity and PK.
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This meets the requirements of the system, as the domain name is a unique
identity for the domain and is publicly available to all parties.
5.1.4 Signature Generation
This step is executed when a user wants to send an email. The MTA
will generate a signature for the sending user's email address (e.g. al-
ice@example.com) using the SK and system parameters of the domain. This
signature is then appended to MAIL FROM: command as an additional pa-
rameter (see gure 5.3). The use of additional parameters in MAIL FROM: is
allowed and in line with the current SMTP specications [49].
Figure 5.3: Email processing with iSATS.
5.1.5 Signature Verication
On receiving the MAIL FROM: command, the MTA on the receiving side will
verify the signature. For verication the MTA will use the public system
parameters, signature (extracted from MAIL FROM:), signed text i.e. sending
user's email address from MAIL FROM: and the domain name of the sender as
the public key (see gure 5.3). The entire verication process is completed
before replying to MAIL FROM:, which gives recipients the option to reject
the message before its content is sent.
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5.2 Discussion
5.2.1 iSATS complementary to LENS
Both iSATS and LENS operate on the email envelope i.e. on MAIL FROM:
and RCPT TO: transactions of the SMTP protocol. This helps in ltering the
emails at an early stage before the content is transferred. iSATS is proposed
as a complementary service to LENS and it will be the decision of the email
service provider (or domain administration) to use iSATS or use an existing
sender authentication scheme. If both the systems are used together, the
sever authentication can be skipped during the legitimacy verication of
GK (x 3.7) in LENS, since the identity of the MSs is already validated by
PKG/TA at the time of joining iSATS (x 5.1.3).
Figure 5.4: iSATS complementary to LENS and existing spam lters.
5.2.2 Email forwarding
In email forwarding, it is a common practice not to change the return path
or MAIL FROM: message envelop. This is an Achilles' heel in IP-based SPF
[76]. However, for iSATS, message forwarding is not a problem as long as
MAIL FROM: command remains intact.
5.2.3 Message munging
iSATS does not operate on the content of an email. If the content of the
message is altered during transit by a mailing list (which is a common prac-
tice) it will have no eect on iSATS, unlike DKIM [76].
5.2.4 Security of TA
In iSATS, the security of the TA is very crucial and if an attacker is able
to obtain the TA's master key, he would be able to issue SKs and generate
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valid signatures. It is synonymous to securing a certication authority (such
as VeriSign) for the legitimacy of the issued certicates. In order to secure
central TA, Boneh and Franklin [20] introduce a concept for distributing the
TA (PKG) in such a manner that the master key is distributed over a set
of nodes so that each node has no information over the key itself. Domains
can extract their SK by obtaining partial keys from a subset of these nodes,
where the subset must be bigger than a certain threshold. This kind of
distribution minimizes the eect of DDoS attacks. Further discussion of the
security of the TA is beyond the scope of this thesis and will be considered
in future work.
5.2.5 Attack on secret key of domain
Protection of SK is the responsibility of the MTA or the Domain. Attacks
related to key thefts are synonymous to hacking the domain and the corre-
sponding defense mechanisms are beyond the scope of this thesis. Hence,
the discussion on key theft and revocation mechanisms has been left as a
future work.
5.2.6 Signature re-use or Mis-use
In order to avoid reuse or misuse of signatures by a potential attacker it
is recommended to use a unique signature for each message. This can be
done by using a nonce (a unique number used only once) and instead of
just signing the sender's email id the MTA can sign email ID + nonce. The
nonce can be composed of a time stamp value, message ID or a combination
of both. With this addition, the new MAIL FROM: command will be MAIL
FROM : <alice@example.com>, ccsig = Sign ( alice@example.com + nonce
), nonce.
5.2.7 Sender reputation
Email sender authentication systems only authenticate the identity of the
email senders at the domain level. For the legitimacy of the domain it is
recommended that each domain maintain a local reputation for the domains
that are sending emails. As part of future work, sender reputation can also
be centralized at the TA level, based on the feedback of individual legitimate
domains.
Nowadays, it is also a common practice in legitimate domains, ISPs and
major web-mail providers to run bot detectors against non-human automatic
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account creation and impose an email sending limit between 100 to 1000
recipients/day [2].
5.3 iSATS PROTOTYPE and EVALUATION
A basic prototype implementation of iSATS has been developed, which in-
cludes a server implementation that oers the basic functionality of a TA
like system setup (generation of system parameters and master key in the
beginning), extraction and distribution of SK to the requesting domain.
iSATS based email processing (ID based signature generation and veri-
cation) has been integrated during the SMTP transactions with the Mutt
mail client, the MailAvenger SMTP daemon (mailavenger.org), and the
Postx MTA (postx.org). The prototype is based on Cha-Cheon IBS
scheme [24] and utilize Pairing-Based Cryptographic [54] library to handle
the cryptographic functions. Instead of modifying the SMTP implementa-
tion iSATS runs as an independent daemon (like spamd for SpamAssassin:
spamassassin.apache.org) to monitor the SMTP transaction and takes dif-
ferent actions based on the results of this monitoring.
The potential bottlenecks of iSATS are the computationally expensive
tasks, specically signature generation and verication, and the extraction
of SKs by the TA. To evaluate the inuence of iSATS on email processing,
the performance of the tasks mentioned above are evaluated on dierent
platforms with varying computational capabilities. To put results in per-
spective, the email processing performance without iSATS is analyzed on
the same systems and provided as a reference. The system specication for
the evaluations are as follows:
Workstation: A 2.0 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo machine with 3 GB RAM.
Netbook: A single core 1.6 GHz Intel Atom CPU with 1 GB RAM. The
netbook is used to evaluate iSATS in resource constraint environment.
Virtual Machine (VM): For the initial implementation and testing a vir-
tual machine environment has been used, consisting of two virtualized
Ubuntu Server installations on a VMware ESXihost. Each VM has
been assigned a 2.4 GHz quad-core Intel Xeon CPU and 256 MB RAM.
To simulate a system with low performance the CPU clock has been
limited to 800 MHz , where denoted.
During the evaluations the physical systems are connected over a LAN,
whereas the VMs are connected over a virtual network.
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5.3.1 Performance of TA in SK extraction
For the performance of TA, the ability of a TA to handle the SK extraction
requests has been studied and throughput and processing delay are used as
a performance metrics to evaluate SK extraction.
Figure 5.5: The throughput of secret key generation.
Throughput
In order to measure the throughput of TA's SK extraction, the servers at
the netbook and the workstation are bombarded with 1000 SK requests
as rapidly as possible. Even with bombardment of SK requests both the
netbook and workstation were able to successfully handle 17 and 23 requests
per second respectively (see gure 5.5). It is also interesting to notice that
both the servers eventually nished the SK extraction for all the requests
received.
Processing delay
On average it takes around 43 ms to receive a SK with workstation as a
TA. For netbook the average processing delay for SK request is around 68
ms (see gure 5.6). Since the experiments were done over LAN, it does not
involve any latency due to geographic distance between domain requesting
the SK and the TA. Ideally each domain is expected to query the TA just
once for a SK, therefore the processing delay introduced due to the SK
request will become insignicant overtime.
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Figure 5.6: The average processing delay of SK generation.
5.3.2 Performance of email processing with iSATS
For evaluating the system performance of email processing with iSATS, stan-
dard email processing system has been augmented with iSATS implemen-
tation (ID based signature generation and verication), and deployed on
the netbook and workstation over the LAN. Dierent experiments were per-
formed to study the impact on throughput, delay, and CPU and memory
consumption. VM setup of iSATS is also used in the experiments.
Throughput
To evaluate the throughput, three dierent experiments were run on dier-
ent setups (workstation, netbook, 2.4 GHz VM and 800 MHz VM) both
with and without running iSATS during the experiments. For the rst ex-
periment, a burst of 1000 messages are sent, without any delay in between,
to the respective systems. For the second and third experiment a delay of
0.1 and 0.2 seconds has been introduced between each message.
On the workstation, the throughput with and without iSATS remained
identical for all three experiments (See gure 5.7). In the rst experiment
with no delays, the throughput on the netbook declines signicantly from
15.28 to 5.67 messages per second after iSATS was activated. However,
with the addition of delays in experiment 2 and 3 the throughput remains
identical at 5+ messages per second with and without iSATS. On the VMs
the inuence of iSATS is negligible and the throughput is almost identical
for experiment 2 and 3 on dierent CPU resources. The disproportional
performance of the virtual machines is due to the absence of a physical LAN
connection. Overall, the results indicate that iSATS does not aect the
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Figure 5.7: The average email throughput on dierent setups.
throughput signicantly if the computing capabilities are sucient.
Processing delay
In order to evaluate the processing delay, 1000 messages are sent with an
interval of 0.5s on the servers running iSATS with dierent computational
setups. The results are averaged in gure 5.8 and the values show the extra
time that was needed to process an email using iSATS. As expected, the
processing delay on the netbook is highest at an average of 185 ms. The
delay on the workstation is only 62 ms on average, or about one third of
the netbook. Nevertheless, the processing cost of an email with iSATS is
minimal.
CPU and Memory usage
The eect of iSATS on CPU and memory usage has been analyzed over
a time span of 10 minutes, while receiving a message every 0.3 s. This
experiment is also performed without iSATS to provide a reference point.
The CPU usage is almost identical on all systems, irrespective of iSATS
(see gure 5.9). The spikes on the netbook are assumed to be caused by
system processes that have nothing to do with email processing.
The memory usage is also minimal and it is hard to notice any dier-
ence when iSATS is running (see gure 5.10). On the netbook, the higher
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Figure 5.8: The average email processing delay with iSATS.
memory usage as compared to workstation is primarily due to its limited
resources. In the end it can be concluded that iSATS has no signicant
eect on CPU and memory resources.
Figure 5.9: The cpu usage during email processing.
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Figure 5.10: The memory usage during email processing.
Based on the results presented in this section, it has been observed that
iSATS is computationally ecient. iSATS is fast in processing emails and
even on a low end processing machines the overheads are in milliseconds.
The TA also scales eciently with SK request bursts and has a overhead
within milliseconds even on a low end processing machine.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter introduced iSATS, a new email sender authentication system
that leverages identity based signatures for stronger sender authenticity than
existing solutions. With the help of a trusted authority, iSATS forms a
closed system that provides a reliable and easy way to bind the identity
of a legitimate sender to an email. On the other hand, it is hard for the
spammer to adopt the system without getting noticed. In addition to this,
iSATS operates on email envelope, specically on MAIL FROM: command,
which makes it easy to reject spam before receiving the actual content.
iSATS is complementary to LENS and the evaluation of the prototype
shows the feasibility of the proposed system, and also reveals how it can be
integrated with tools commonly used throughout the email infrastructure.
The results show promising performance with low processing overhead on
dierent platforms.
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Chapter 6
Security Concerns
6.1 False Positives and Negatives
In LENS spam prevention is based on social communities andGK formation.
Since LENS does not rely on content ltering, it does not encounter any false
positive or negatives generated by imprecise content signatures. However,
there is a possibility that due to false deduction of social context, malicious
users can become part of the community and hence result in false-negatives
(i.e. spam messages). But even with the presence of malicious users, LENS
would not have false positives (i.e. non-delivery of good emails).
6.2 Compromised User
If a user (who may also be a GK ) is compromised (say someone steals his
identity), it will only have a local eect within the community. The eect is
temporary and only lasts until the victimized user broadcasts the incident
using his other Ids (maybe through friends or word of mouth) or claims
back his ownership from the email service provider. Let us suppose that the
victimized user is unable to reclaim the ownership of his Id. In that case,
the user can always request its community to abandon his compromised Id
and the MS will remove all the data associated with the compromised Id
from the PKList and VoucherList. Hence, the attacker would not be able
to harm the system on a large scale as the SKs and vouchers are handled
internally by the MS.
6.3 Malicious User
If spam originates from a user associated with GK (one of the community
member of the GK is malicious), the recipient can report the oending
user as a spammer. Upon receiving certain threshold of reports, the MS
of the recipient will either add the oending user to the revocation list (re-
mote user) or mark the user (local user) as illegitimate to prevent further
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spamming. One user's bad behavior will not prevent all other users associ-
ated with the GK from communicating with the recipient. On a dierent
note, let us suppose that a GK becomes malicious (or violates the protocol)
and start vouching for illegitimate (spammers) users within and beyond its
community. This will result in transmission of spam messages towards the
recipient, due to which the recipient will have to report multiple oending
users as spammers to the MS. If the MS receives several spam reports for
the users associated with the GK, the recipient's MS will revoke the GK by
deleting corresponding entry in the PKList, resulting in invalidating all the
vouching from the GK.
6.4 Trust Farming
A Spammer cannot increase his own TR by giving votes to others i.e. by
sending emails. However, spammers can launch a trust farming attack on
LENS, where a spammer votes for another spammer(s) to increase their
rank. This attack is comparable to link farming on the Internet to attack
the PageRank. However, extensive work has already been done to identify
and neutralize such attacks on social reputation schemes. Mature solutions
like [77] can be used orthogonally in LENS to identify and protect against
trust farming.
6.5 Human Spamming using GK Selection in
Stage 3
Stage 3 of GK Selection protocol allows new users to send emails to com-
plete strangers. A new user who is also a spammer can exploit stage 3 to
become a GK and spam the recipient. However, due to rate limit on emails
from GKs, whose UT is new (NU ), the scale of the attack will be small.
Furthermore, creation of arbitrary new IDs (if a spammer care about being
reported and does not reuse old ID ever) and repetition of stage 3 will re-
quire substantial human involvement. This will incur costs that are against
the normal spamming model.
6.6 Voucher Misuse and Revocation
The vouchers issued by theGK are bound with the identities (userid+domain
for e.g. abc@example.com) of the community members and can only be used
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by the user to whom they are issued. Current version of LENS does not
impose any expiration date on the vouchers. Vouchers become invalid or
get revoked/terminated by the MS based on four conditions: 1) when a GK
removes a user from his community, the MS will also remove the associ-
ated vouchers (even if the user gets hold of the voucher, he cannot use the
voucher on his own after being removed), 2) the user himself gets out of
GK's community, 3) UT of the user becomes negative, and 4) if recipient
revokes the GK, all the associated vouchers will become invalid.
6.7 Malicious GK Faking UserType (UT)
By design GK has no control in manipulating theMS to send false UT. There
exist two possibilities where an illegitimate GK can send a false UT to the
recipient. In the rst case, a malicious GK can host a private MS, certied
by a trusted certication authority and congure it to always send legitimate
for his UT. However, by doing so the malicious GK will also become visible.
This is not an option for spammers as it makes them vulnerable to legal
actions. In the second scenario, theMS could be compromised by a malicious
GK. This is synonymous to hacking the MS and the corresponding defense
mechanisms are beyond the scope of this thesis.
6.8 Key Theft
Protection of keys is the responsibility of the MSs. Attacks related to key
thefts is synonymous to hacking the MS and the corresponding defense
mechanisms are beyond the scope of this thesis.
6.9 LENS: A Self-Correcting System
It is true that if a spammer can get a GK to vouch for him, he can spam all
the recipients who authorize that GK. But the nice thing about the proposed
scheme is that the system is potentially self-correcting. If the GK vouching
for the spammer doesn't stop vouching, then the GK will likely be revoked.
This may happen at many dierent levels, since the recipients are free to
decide the level to which they want to adjust their limits to tolerate the
misbehavior (including the possibility of removing the GKs they authorize
to vouch for). In the end, the user at fault will be eectively treated as
a spammer. For this reason, it is also unlikely that a legitimate GK will
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willingly vouch for a spammer since they know what the consequence will
be.
6.10 Weakness of Trust Relationships
Bilge et al. [19] showed the ease with which an attacker can automati-
cally clone Facebook user proles and convince large fraction of the victim's
friends to become a friend of the cloned (malicious) contact. Email network
can be turned into a social network/graph based on the communication
pattern. In email social networks cloning a prole, which in this case is the
user's email address, is not similar to cloning a Facebook prole which has
all its data publicly available.
LENS identies the notion of trust between two users with the notion
of friendship in email social networks. In LENS when two users add each
other as friends it means that both of them trust each other to be non-
spammer and not necessarily some close friends. This trust is based on
personal acquaintance or exchange of messages over time. The notion of
friendship in an email social network is not necessarily associated to full
trust with respect to the other individual's security practices, nor to his
ability to wisely choose its friends. LENS addresses the existence of weak
links (or malicious nodes) in social relations by simply reporting community
members that prove to be malicious over time.
Friendship information is private and LENS does not exchange contacts,
CommList, PKList and VoucherList between dierent MSs. All the infor-
mation is kept on the user's MS just like user's very private/personal mes-
sages, email contacts and authentication (for e.g. password) information.
This data is normally protected under privacy and data protection laws.
6.11 Change in Internet Infrastructure
A basic requirement for any practical system is that it does not make ma-
jor changes to the Internet infrastructure (e.g. SMTP or other protocols).
LENS fully complies with this requirement as it does not change exist-
ing protocols (like SMTP). Community formation, GK selection and trust
management run as independent components. LENS based email processing
(using CommList and vouchers issued by the GK ) run as an independent
daemon (like spamd for SpamAssassin) to monitor the SMTP transaction
and based on the results take dierent actions.
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Chapter 7
Evaluations
The performance of LENS has been evaluated using trace-driven simulations
(x 7.1, x 7.2) and a Linux based prototype implementation (x 7.3, x 7.4).
Our evaluations focused on: i) scalability, ii) eectiveness in accepting all
inbound emails, iii) performance of GK selection, and iv) computational
complexity of email processing with LENS.
7.1 Scalability Evaluation with OSN Data
To study the scalability of LENS, simulations have been developed based
on three large scale OSN datasets: Facebook [73], (Google) Buzz [47] and
Flickr [58]. Data samples of Facebook, Buzz and Flickr are good choices
for evaluating LENS as they represent real online social connections. Cur-
rently, Facebook is the largest social network in the world and the number
one photo sharing site on the internet. It is a \pure" social network in the
sense that its primary purpose is to nd and connect users. The Facebook
data sample used in the evaluations consists of 3.1 million users with over 23
million edges and an average of 15.2 friends per user. The Buzz data sample
consists of 2.1 million users with over 5.2 million edges and 4.5 friends on
average for each user. Flickr is not a pure social network and is intended pri-
marily for publishing, organizing and locating content. The Flickr dataset
consists of 1.7 million users with over 15 million edges and an average of
18.1 friends per user. Table 7.1 presents the high-level statistics. For the
evaluations 4000 users have been selected randomly from the Facebook and
Flickr datasets. In the much larger Buzz data set, 1 million users are ran-
domly chosen. In each case, the selection is restricted to users with at least
25 friends, to avoid anomalous gures due to isolated users.
For the evaluations on the OSN datasets, it is preferred to understand
the burden imposed by LENS on the social network in terms of the number
of GKs required, and the expected return, in terms of increased reachability
via those GKs. In other words, for the results the main interest lies in: 1)
reasonable number of GKs selected for a particular recipient and 2) reach-
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ability of the recipient (i.e. maximum number of legitimate users with a
minimum number of GKs). Note that due to limited depth of OSN dataset
the GK selection procedure has been evaluated only for stage 1. Although
the datasets contain millions of users, the average path lengths are no more
than 5 hops.
Table 7.1: High-level stats of OSN datasets.
Social network data set Facebook Flickr Buzz
Number of Users 3,097,165 1,715,255 2,123,421
Number of Edges 23,667,394 15,555,041 5,257,684
Average Friends 15.28 18.13 4.59
Clustering Coecient 0.175 0.313 0.09
Avg Path Length 5.13 5.67 5.39
Average Community Size 1,587.32 4,398.44 189
7.1.1 Burden imposed: number of GKs required
Since each boundary user's (also FoFs) MS suggests a GK at each stage
of GK selection (some FoFs may suggest the same GK, so the relation-
ship is not strictly linear), the number of GKs required depends on the
number of FoFs which in turn depends on the community size (number
of friends+FoFs). Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 show the number of GKs and
FoFs required for Facebook, Flickr and Buzz respectively. In each case, the
numbers are quite modest. Facebook requires 56{871 GKs (<50% of com-
munity size); Flickr requires 20{400 GKs (<30% of community size), and
Buzz requires 14{478 GKs (<30% of community size).
72
7.1. Scalability Evaluation with OSN Data
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
 200  400  600  800  1000  1200  1400
S
iz
e
Size of Community
GK Count
No. of FoFs
No. of GKs
Figure 7.1: Number of GKs for receiving messages in Facebook dataset.
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Figure 7.2: Number of GKs for receiving messages in Flickr dataset.
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Figure 7.3: Number of GKs for receiving messages in (Google) Buzz dataset.
7.1.2 Expected return: increased reachability via GKs
This section presents the number of additional users that can be reached via
GKs. A larger number of GKs will clearly allow more users to be reached;
thus reachability has been plotted as a function of number of GKs. Fig-
ures 7.4 and 7.5 show the results for Facebook and Flickr respectively. The
y1 axis measures absolute number of users reached (scaled to measure tens
of thousands of users; i.e., a1 on the y1 axis indicates 10K users); the y2
axis gives the same number as a percentage of the total number of users in
the network. Figures 7.6 and 7.7 show the absolute number (scaled to tens
of thousands of users) and percentage gures for the Buzz data set.
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Figure 7.4: Reachability of recipient via GKs in Facebook dataset.
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Figure 7.5: Reachability of recipient via GKs in Flickr dataset.
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Figure 7.6: Reachability (#) of recipient via GKs in (Google) Buzz dataset.
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Figure 7.7: Reachability (%) of recipient via GKs in (Google) Buzz dataset.
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In Facebook, with a minimum number of GKs, the reachability of a
recipient ranges from 700K to 1.7 million which is 22% to 55% of the total
network and remains over 40% most of the time. In Flickr, the reachability
is between 40% to 54% of the network and mostly remains above 45%. In the
much larger Buzz data set, only 0.02% of users ever get selected as GKs, and
the maximum reachability achieved is 12.5%. It is simply because of small
community size which directly aects the reach of the recipients via GKs.
The average community size in Buzz is 189, which is very small compared
to Facebook and Flickr. This seems to indicate that more than 2 rounds of
GK selection is required to attain reasonable reachability in Buzz.
The results of these evaluations show that LENS is scalable in terms of
number of required GKs and reachability. With the help of only hundreds of
GKs, a recipient can be reliably reached by millions of users (>40% of users
in Facebook and Flickr). In contrast, in RE:, a user is only reachable reliably
from within his community (friends, FoF ). The average reliable reachability
in RE: is 0.051% and 0.25% of the network for each recipient in Facebook
and Flickr respectively.
7.1.3 Altruistic commitment and security
A key requirement of the protocol is that GK's MS, which is unrelated to re-
cipient'sMS should altruistically spend resources to help it. Although LENS
has been designed to make this as lightweight as possible (each voucher veri-
cation for a recipient requires no more than a table look up for verication),
as the social network scales and more and more users are selected as GK,
the GK's MS could end up being overwhelmed. To understand this impact,
Buzz which has the largest data set has been studied. The results show
that a total of 358K (i.e. 16%) distinct users are selected as GKs. More
than 80% of the users selected as GKs have less than 300 recipients. Thus,
the additional burden of altruistic processing imposed on GK's MS is not
overwhelming for any MS. It is also worth mentioning that this also has a
positive implication for security i.e. if and when a GK is compromised by a
spammer, the aected number of recipients remain limited.
The results in this subsection suggest that LENS is scalable in terms of
number of required GKs and reachability. With the help of only hundreds
of GKs, a recipient can be reached by millions of users (>40% of users
in Facebook and Flickr, and up to 12.5% in Buzz) and the solution can
be extended to the users with even farther social distance by additional
GK selection. In contrast, in RE: which handles up to FoF, a user will
only be reachable reliably from its community (friends, FoFs). The average
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reachability in RE: is 0.051%, 0.25% and 0.01% of the network for each
recipient in Facebook, Flickr and Buzz respectively. An increase in the
recipient's community size directly aects its reachability. Users having a
larger community would benet more from LENS than isolated and less
socially connected users.
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Figure 7.8: Recipients per GK in (Google) Buzz dataset.
7.2 Real Email Trace Driven Evaluation
x7.1.2 studied reachability between arbitrary sets of users. In reality, most
senders can be expected to be socially close to their recipients. To evaluate
the eectiveness of LENS in assuring legitimacy of senders and the abil-
ity to accept all the legitimate inbound emails, the performance of LENS has
been studied using two real email traces. One of this trace is taken from En-
ron (http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/) which is a large commercial unit,
whereas the other one consists of University of Kiel's email servers log les
[33]. Kiel's email server logs record the source and destination of every email
from or to a student account over a period of 112 days. The dataset consists
of 447,543 messages exchanged between 57,158 users. Enron's email traces
are mostly of the senior management at Enron. These traces contain a to-
tal of about 1,136,760 messages exchanged between 52,747 users. Messages
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with multiple recipients are counted as one message per recipient.
Following [25, 59, 65], a social network has been extracted from the email
data by examining the messages sent between the users. Specically, an edge
has been created between users who sent at least three emails to each other.
These edges are used to form social graphs for email users. Table 7.2 shows
the high-level statistics of both datasets.
Table 7.2: High-level stats of email datasets.
Email data set Enron Uni-Kiel
Number of Users 52,747 57,158
Number of Edges 74,248 22,648
Messages Exchanged 1,136,760 447,543
Avg Community 167 22
Figure 7.9: Friend, community and GK based ltering on Enron and Uni-
Kiel email traces.
Figure 7.9 shows the acceptance of legitimate inbound email based on
friends, community (friends+FoFs) and GKs in Enron and Uni-Kiel email
traces. First of all, the edge information has been used to apply a friend
lter on the inbound emails i.e. accept an email if it is from a friend (i.e., has
sent > 3 mails). This results in the acceptance of 79% of the emails in Enron
and 80% in Uni-Kiel datasets. Expanding this lter to FoFs, the acceptance
rate increases to 89% in Enron and 81% in Uni-Kiel datasets. This is the
acceptance rate of RE:. Finally, GKs are applied on the datasets using GK
selection procedure at stages 1 and 3. This results in 100% acceptance of
the emails. Hence, the results show that LENS can eectively lter and
accept all the legitimate inbound emails.
79
7.2. Real Email Trace Driven Evaluation
Figure 7.10: Average GKs in Enron and Uni-Kiel email traces.
The number of GKs required for Enron and Uni-Kiel datasets is quite
reasonable (see gure 7.11). In Enron, the resulting number of GKs range
between 6 to 235. The overall average of selected GKs is 31 per user (see
gure 7.10). Out of these 31 GKs, 29.5 GKs are selected in stages 1 and
only 1.5 GKs are selected spontaneously in stage 3. In the worst case, the
GK count is 218 for stage 1 and 15 for stage 3.
On the other hand, in Uni-Kiel, the number of selected GKs is between
5 to 265. The overall average of selected GKs for the Uni Kiel dataset is
9.95 per user (see gure 7.10). Out of these 9.95 GKs, 7.23 GKs are selected
in stage 1 and only 2.7 GKs are selected spontaneously in stage 3. In the
worst case scenario for Uni Kiel dataset, the GK count is 243 for stage 1
and 17 for stage 3.
Figure 7.12 shows the reachability of a particular recipient with the help
of GKs alone, i.e., without counting the reachability achieved by friends and
FoFs. With the GKs selected above, the reachability of a recipient ranges
between 8.9K to 15.8K i.e. 16.8% to 30% of the total users in Enron. In
Uni-Kiel, the reachability of a recipient is between 3.3K to 13.4K i.e. 5.8% to
23.4% of the total users. In contrast, the reachability in RE: (depending on
the community size) on average is much lower and is typically only 0.31% and
0.04% of the network for each recipient in Enron and Uni-Kiel respectively.
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Figure 7.11: No. of GKs in Enron and Uni-Kiel email traces.
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Figure 7.12: Reachability via GKs in Enron and Uni-Kiel email traces.
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In Enron, a total of 3911 users are selected as GKs, which constitutes
7.4% of the total number of users. On the other hand, in Uni-Kiel, 2944 users
(or 5.7% of the total number of users) are selected as GKs. In gure 7.13 the
selected GKs have been distributed according to the number of recipients
they were selected for. In Enron and Uni-Kiel, the distribution pattern
of the number of recipients per GK is similar to that of Buzz. In Enron,
75% of the selected GKs have less than 300 recipients, whereas in Uni-Kiel,
92% of the selected GKs have less than 300 recipients. Thus, if a GK is
compromised by some malicious user, a very limited proportion of recipients
will be aected with spam before the system recovers.
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
0-100
101-200
201-300
301-400
401-500
>500
%
 o
f 
S
el
ec
te
d
 G
K
s
No. of Recipients
Enron
Uni-Kiel
Figure 7.13: Recipients per GK in Enron and Uni-Kiel email traces.
These results indicate that with the help of only a few dozen GKs, a
recipient can successfully receive all legitimate inbound emails.
7.3 Performance of GK Selection Protocol
Electronic mail was not designed to be time critical application and inher-
ently the users are tolerant to reasonable delays that might occur during the
transmission. Nevertheless, within the scope of this thesis, it is important
that the GK selection does not results in huge delays and bog down the
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email infrastructure. In this section, an experiment has been setup to study
the latency of GK selection protocol, when the MSs are located in dierent
countries, with the help of 20 nodes across the globe on PlanetLab. During
the experiment each node sends a random GK selection request to one of the
other 19 nodes after every 0.1 second. Figure 7.14 represents the location
of the MSs on the map.
Figure 7.14: Location of MSs on the map
Figure 7.15 shows the average execution time of GK selection protocol in
stage 1. During the experiment the GK, recipient and the FoF remained on
separate nodes. The average execution time of the protocol ranged between
1.5{4.5 seconds. GK Selection in stage 1 involves an extra step where the
GKs are suggested by FoF to the recipient. Thus, the execution time in
stage 1 is higher than stage 3.
In stage 3, the protocol involves two parties, the recipient's MS and
the GK's MS. Figure 7.16 shows the result of stage 3 execution time. The
average execution time of the protocol on each node remained between 0.5{
1.5 seconds with the only exception of kr node where the average execution
time remained 2.6 seconds. More than 60% of the time was spent on the
transmission of the message and the actual processing time remained less
than 40%.
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Figure 7.15: GK selection stage 1 (x-axis: country codes of the MS 's loca-
tion).
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Figure 7.16: GK selection stage 3 (x-axis: country codes of the MS 's loca-
tion).
Both stage 1 and stage 3 experiments nished with a success rate of
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94.6% to 100% respectively. For a few nodes like kr, jo, eg and br, the
success rate was not 100% due to the node getting overloaded by too many
connections.
7.4 Computational Complexity of Email
Processing with LENS
To analyze the computational complexity and system performance of email
processing with LENS, a standard mail processing system has been aug-
mented with LENS implementation, and deployed over LAN. For evalua-
tions two experimental setups are used, which are discussed in detail below.
Experimental Setup # 1
The rst experimental setup used two MSs running MailAvenger SMTP
server on top of the Postx MTA. The MSs are connected via a local area
network. One of the MS is an Intel atom 1.6 GHz with 1 GB RAM and the
other one is an Intel core2duo 2.53 GHz with 4 GB RAM. This setup is used
to measure the eect of community size, size of VoucherList and the number
of GKs on the processing emails. It is worth noting that the experiments
based on setup # 1 only measure the computational overhead (in terms of
time) of LENS on the SMTP transaction.
7.4.1 Eect of CommList at the recipient's MS
On receiving the RCPT TO: command, the recipient's MS performs a check
to see if the sender is in the recipient's community, and take actions (accep-
t/reject/pass to other lters) according to the policy. Figure 7.17, presents
the results to show the overhead of community size on email processing
with LENS. The community size varies from 0 to 10K. The eect of this
variation on computation overhead on both the MSs is in a few milliseconds
(ms). With the community size of 10K the overhead at one MS (Intel atom
1.6 GHz) is 30 ms and around 9 ms on the other MS (Intel core2duo 2.53
GHz). In Enron the average community size of any user is 167, and the
email processing overhead for that remains under 3 ms for both MSs.
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Figure 7.17: Community list lookup delays at the recipient.
7.4.2 Complexity of voucher verication and eect of
PKList at the recipient's MS
The cost of checking signature has been considered substantial till now.
Therefore, it is important to perform measurements to ensure that the pro-
posed scheme, with its voucher verication does not incur more computa-
tional cost than processing spam. For the generation/verication of signa-
ture (voucher), LENS uses 1024 bits RSA and SHA-1. The computational
complexity (in terms of time) of signature generation or verication has been
tested using OpenSSL [6] speed measurement for RSA-based signatures on
Intel core2duo with 2.53 GHz and 4 GB RAM. In public-key cryptogra-
phy the generation and verication of signature does not have the the same
complexity. It takes approximately 0.13 ms to sign and 0.07 ms to verify a
voucher of 1024 bits RSA and SHA-1.
Voucher verication, when integrated with LENS for email processing,
depends on the size of PKList. The size of the PKList of a recipient is the
same as the number of its GKs. Figure 7.18 shows the overhead of PKList
size on signature verication with LENS. The average GK count in Enron
and Uni-Kiel is 31 and 10 respectively, and 510 in the worst case. Based
on this, the size of PKList is varied between 1 to 1000 for the experiments.
The computational overhead on both the MSs is only few milliseconds (ms).
The overhead at one MS (Intel atom 1.6 GHz) is 6.7 ms and around 2.3 ms
on the other (Intel core2duo 2.53 GHz) with the PKList size of 1000.
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Figure 7.18: PKList list lookup delays at the recipient.
Figure 7.19: PKList list lookup delays at the sender.
7.4.3 Eect of CommList and VoucherList at the sender's
MS
Before the sender's MS sends the RCPT TO: command, it performs a lookup
in the CommList and the VoucherList of the sender to decide if the voucher
needs to be appended or not. Figure 7.19 and 7.20 shows the overhead of the
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CommList and the VoucherList lookups respectively. The size of CommList
was varied from 1 to 10K and VoucherList from 1 to 20K. VoucherList
lookup is performed only if the recipient is not in the community of the
sender and CommList lookup overhead is added to the VoucherList lookups.
In the worst case, the CommList lookup overhead is between 6 to 15 ms on
the two MSs and the overhead of VoucherList lookup is between 12 to 29
ms.
Figure 7.20: Voucher list lookup delays at the sender.
Based on the results presented in this section, it can be concluded that
LENS is computationally ecient. LENS is fast in processing emails and it
also scales eciently with increasing size of the lists (CommList, VoucherList
and PKList), and even on low end processing machines, the overhead is in
milliseconds.
Experimental Setup # 2
The second experimental setup used an SMTP server of 2.53 GHz Intel
core2duo processor, 4 GB RAM and three senders, each running on a dif-
ferent machine connected via LAN (similar to RE :). In this setup dierent
experiments were conducted for 4 dierent scenarios to study the impact
of message size, end-to-end throughput and CPU, memory and bandwidth
consumptions. Each of these scenarios are discussed in detail below.
(S1) In scenario 1, the SMTP server runs postx without any spam lter.
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(S2) SpamAssassin, which is one of the most widely used content-based
lter, uses a variety of mechanisms including header and text anal-
ysis, Bayesian ltering, DNS blacklists, and collaborative ltering
databases to lter spam before it reaches the mailbox. For compari-
son with LENS, SpamAssassin is used as a content-based lter with
Postx in scenario 2.
(S3) In scenario 3, MailAvenger is used on top of postx and LENS based
community ltering is enabled. In this scenario the SMTP server is
able to lter (accept/reject) emails at the RCPT TO: command based
on the recipient's CommList (containing 10K entries for all the exper-
iments).
(S4) Scenario 4 is similar to S3 with additional email ltering that is per-
formed on the voucher's issued by the authorized GKs of the recipient.
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Figure 7.21: Eect of size on email processing with LENS.
7.4.4 Eect of message size
In order to measure the eect of message size on processing time, 50K mes-
sages are sent with varying sizes (1 KB to 50KB). Figure 7.21 shows the
processing delays in all 4 scenarios. S2 exhibits a linear increase in pro-
cessing time with the increase in the message size and takes 2.6 seconds to
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process a message of 50KB. S1, S3 and S4 remain unaected by the mes-
sage size. S3 and S4 take slightly more time (0.2 to 0.3 secs more) than S1,
which is primarily due to the additional overhead from MailAvenger and
LENS based ltering.
Interestingly, S3 and S4 show similar processing delays, as the MS in S4
does not have to traverse the CommList (which is xed at 10K entries in the
experiments) and only veries the vouchers issued by the GK. The results
also show that the time required to process the CommList is very close to
that required to verify the voucher. In short, LENS based email processing
incurs negligible amount of additional processing delays and remains very
close to S1 (no spam ltering).
7.4.5 Throughput
In order to measure end-to-end throughput of the MS, the senders simulta-
neously bombard the MS with enough messages to saturate it (e.g., sending
1000 messages of 8 KB each as rapidly as possible). Figure 7.22 shows the
throughput of all the four scenarios. Even with the bombardment of mes-
sages S1 was able to receive 11 messages per second. This reduced down to
4.2, 4.03 and 3.2 in S3, S4 and S2 respectively.
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Figure 7.22: Throughput(msgs/sec).
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7.4.6 CPU, memory, bandwidth and delays
In order to understand the load of emails for a large size company or uni-
versity, the inbound email statistics has been retrieved from University of
Gottingen for a period of one year (Feb 2010 to Jan 2011). The overall in-
bound emails are averaged to approximately 42K per day (see gure 7.23).
Based on these gure, in the next experiment the number of inbound emails
has been approximated to 50K / day with a transmission time of 8 hours.
This means that xed size (8KB) emails has been sent to the MS after every
0.6sec for 8 hours and the usage of CPU, memory, bandwidth and processing
delay have been measured in all 4 scenarios.
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Figure 7.23: Yearly stats of inbound emails from University of Gottingen.
The CPU measurement results (gure 7.24) show S2 is very expensive in
terms of CPU usage (80%-90%). This is because content-based ltering has
to apply dierent rules and lters. In contrast, the CPU usage of S3 and S4
is similar to S1, low as 10%-12% on average.
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Figure 7.24: CPU usage.
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Figure 7.25: Memory usage.
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Figure 7.26: Incoming trac.
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Figure 7.27: Outgoing trac.
As shown in gure 7.25, the memory usage in S1 remained almost con-
stant at 20%. In S3 and S4 the value remained between 20% and 23.3%.
For S3 it is higher than S4 due to CommList lookup. S2 requires highest
93
7.5. Conclusion
memory (23.9%-29.1%).
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 14
 0  50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
 400
 450
P
ro
ce
ss
in
g
 d
el
ay
(1
=
1
0
0
 m
s)
Experiment Time (min)
S1
S2
S3
S4
Figure 7.28: Processing delay.
Figure 7.26 and 7.27 shows that, as the message size is kept constant,
there is not much dierence between the 4 scenarios in terms of inbound (16-
22 KB/s) and outbound (2-4 KB/s) trac. The latter mostly constitutes
the SMTP transactional trac.
The processing delay in all scenarios (cf. gure 7.28) remained almost
constant due to a x message frequency and size. Interestingly, the pro-
cessing delays in S3 and S4 are only about half of S2 and are very close to
S1.
In short, LENS (S3 and S4) is fairly lightweight and has a performance
close to the scenarios where no spam ltering is used.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the extensive evaluations of LENS using three large
social networks (Flickr with 1.7 million users, Facebook with 3.1 million
users and Google Buzz with 2.1 million users) and two traces of email trans-
actions (Uni-Kiel, 57.1 K users and Enron, 52.7 K users). LENS is able
to receive all incoming emails in the email traces with an average of just
31 (0.06% of users) GKs per recipient in the Enron dataset and 10 GKs
(0.017% of users) in the Uni-Kiel dataset. The evaluations with the social
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network traces show that with the help of hundreds of GKs, a recipient can
be possibly reached by millions of users. The solution can be scalably ex-
tended to users with larger social distances by iterative GK selection. LENS
performed the worst on Google Buzz dataset, where a recipient has to choose
478 GKs on average in order to enable 12.5% of the social network to send
emails to him. Whereas for Facebook with an average of 871 GKs a recipi-
ent can be reached by 55% of the social network. In Flickr, with an average
of just 400 GKs a recipient is able to receive emails from 54% of the total
user-base. For the Google Buzz and email traces around 80% to 92% of the
selected GKs have less than 300 recipients. Thus, if an attacker compro-
mise a GK, the aected number of recipients remains limited. LENS also
proved to be faster in processing emails (around 2-3 orders of magnitude
faster) than the most popular content-based lter i.e. SpamAssassin [10]
and scales eciently with increasing community size and GKs with compu-
tational overhead of a few milliseconds. The prototype implementation of
LENS in Postx/MailAvenger shows that the overheads imposed by addi-
tional processing are tolerably small. LENS consumes up to 75% less CPU
and 9% less memory compared to current solutions like SpamAssassin. In
short, LENS imposes zero overhead for the normal scenario of frequent and
familiar senders, and remains lightweight for the general case.
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Conclusion and Future Work
The main part of this thesis presents LENS, a novel, easily adaptable and
scalable spam prevention system with low processing overheads. Leveraging
recipient's social network, LENS mitigates spam beyond social circles with
the help of trusted users, called GKs. LENS can be deployed individually
by small groups of users, and with the help of social GKs it is feasible and
practical to further enhance the reliable email delivery beyond FoFs i.e.
outside the recipient's social community.
This thesis illustrates that with only a modest number of GKs, each re-
cipient is able to cover a large part of the legitimate social network, allowing
most people to reach it. Furthermore, since the process of GK selection
is performed independently by each recipient, the breakdown of individual
GKs can only help spam those recipients who have chosen it as GK and do
not compromise the security of most recipients. The aected recipients can
curtail their damage by rotating their GKs. On the other hand, an attacker
would have to compromise a large fraction of the set of GKs in order to
compromise a large number of recipients.
Essentially, the protocol requires a rst-time sender's (senders from out-
side the social circle of a particular recipient) MS to present a valid voucher,
at the SMTP time, before sending the payload. This enables the recipient's
MS to quickly terminate an invalid connection and stop spam at the rst
place from transmitting, instead of only ltering from mailboxes. Thus, the
network operators can save the operating cost due to large amount of spam
crossing their networks.
The key contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
1. Unlike the existing social network based approaches, LENS proposes
a feasible and practical approach to extend spam prevention
beyond the social network of a recipient, covering all the commu-
nication scenarios for legitimate inbound emails (no legitimate email
is stopped from transmission).
2. This thesis skips the cat-and-mouse game and instead of looking for
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spammers, LENS explores good actors in order to facilitate
legitimate emails from legitimate MSs.
3. LENS lters all the legitimate inbound emails at the SMTP
envelop (RCPT TO: command of SMTP transaction), before the ac-
tual transmission of email payload. This enables the recipient's MS to
quickly terminate any invalid connection and fundamentally prevent
the transmission of spam across the network.
4. This thesis also proposes iSATS, a new crypto-based email sender au-
thentication mechanism. iSATS is complementary to LENS and
provide a reliable way to bind the identity of a legitimate
sender to an email with stronger sender authentication than
existing solutions.
With the use of extensive evaluations, this thesis also illustrates the
following.
 The evaluations on the empirical online social network datasets proves
the system to be scalable with large fraction of users and can
be easily extended to millions of users.
 The experiments on real email traces demonstrates that LENS is
eective in accepting all the inbound emails eciently and
the space requirement and message overhead is also quite reasonable.
 LENS remains lightweight for email processing. The system
evaluations show that LENS consumes up to 75% less CPU and 9% less
memory as traditional solutions like SpamAssassin. The system also
scales eciently with increasing size of the lists (CommList, PKList
and VoucherList).
 Even for distant MSs the network latency for GK selection
remains low. With the help of 20 nodes across the globe on Plan-
etLab, the evaluations show that the GK selection protocol requires
approx 0.5 { 4.5 secs.
 The system stress testing and micro-benchmarks shows that iSATS
is computationally ecient. Even on a low end processing machine,
the overheads of processing emails with iSATS are in couple
of milliseconds. The TA also scales eciently with burst of SK
requests.
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This thesis touches upon a new solution in the area of using email social
network and GKs concept to establish a trust infrastructure for reliable
email delivery and to stop spam from traversing across the network, but
work needs to be done. Some of the directions worth investigating in future
work are:
 Automatic community formation: In LENS, the community formation
is a selective process involving certain human involvement to maintain
high level of privacy. In order to facilitate easy and rapid adoption
of the system, LENS should explore new mechanism to automate the
community formation, while maintaining the same high level of pri-
vacy.
 Collaborative Spam reporting : The eectiveness of the spam reports
can be increased by introducing inter-domain collaborative reporting
of the spam. These reports can be stored at a central repository with
easy access. This will benet in detecting malicious users at an earlier
stage.
 LENS deployment : This thesis integrates LENS with the existing
email infrastructure using mutt email client, the MailAvenger SMTP
daemon, and Postx as an MTA. It would be benecial to implement
and deploy LENS in an actual commercial or academic unit to study
its impact.
 iSATS deployment : iSATS has been deployed on a small scale. Both,
the virtual and LAN environment are limited to couple of nodes. Al-
though it is justiable for the proof of concept and basic system perfor-
mance, a real world topology with 20 plus nodes in the LAN or Planet
would give more insight to system performance and its bottleneck.
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